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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, in Revenue Ruling 88-76,1 the Internal Revenue Service
(the "Service") classified an unincorporated organization operating
*B.A., 1982, Emory; J.D., 1985, Tulane University; LL.M., 1986, New York University;
member of the New York Bar and associated with the law firm of Chadbourne & Parke in New
York City. The author thanks her former law professors, R. Donald Turlington, Robert J.
Peroni, and Thomas J. Andre, Jr. for their valuable comments and assistance in the preparation
of this article.
1. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
under the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act2 as a partnership
for federal income tax purposes.3 Under the tests for determining
entity classification set out in section 301.7701-2 of the regulations,
4
the limited liability company ("LLC") lacked the corporate characteris-
tics of continuity of life and free transferability of interests.6 Con-
sequently, the LLC did not possess a majority of corporate characteris-
tics. The Service therefore classified the entity as a partnership, even
though it possessed the corporate characteristic of limited liabilityA
This ruling ends the uncertainty7 that has surrounded LLCs since
their statutory creation by Wyoming in 19778 and Florida in 1982. 9
2. Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act, WYo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1977).
3. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
4. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1983). Unless otherwise indicated, all references
to sections of the "Code" or the "regulations" refer to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
amended, and the regulations promulgated thereunder.
5. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
6. Id. at 361.
7. The Service showed initial hostility to LLCs by proposing amendments to the entity
classification regulations which would have conclusively treated LLCs as corporations for tax
purposes. See 45 Fed. Reg. 75,709 (proposed Nov. 17, 1980, later withdrawn). After those
proposed regulations were finally withdrawn, see Announcement 83-4, 1983-2 I.R.B. 30 (Jan.
14, 1983), the Service stated it would conduct an extensive study concerning the effect of the
limited liability characteristic on entity classification. Id. Before the Service published Revenue
Ruling 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, § 5.37 of Revenue Procedure 88-3, 1988-1 C.B. 579 included the
classification of limited liability companies for federal income tax purposes on the list of areas
where the Service will not rule. Revenue Procedure 88-44, 1988-2 C.B. 634 modifies Revenue
Procedure 88-3 by deleting § 5.37. See also Rev. Proc. 89-3, 1989-3 I.R.B. 29 for the current
list of areas where the Service will not rule.
8. See supra note 2.
9. Florida Limited Liability Company Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 608.401-.471 (1987). To date, no
other state has passed a limited liability company act.
The LLC somewhat resembles, but is far superior to, two other business organizations known
as limitadas and limited partnership associations. Limitadas are foreign organizations that grant
all members limited liability and can be structured to lack the corporate characteristics of
continuity of life and free transferability of interests. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,003,072 (Oct. 25,
1979), I.R.S. Let. Rulings Rep. (CCH) No. 152 (Jan. 29, 1980), where the Service classified a
Brazilian limitada as a partnership for tax purposes. Id. Limitadas have not been extensively
used in the United States because of certain restrictions on the amount of capital and other
restrictions which generally allow only natural persons to be members. Additionally, some
commentators have expressed doubt whether courts would respect the limited liability feature
if the limitada were sued in the United States. See Burke & Sessions, Partnerships and Subchap-
ter S, 54 J. TAX'N 232 (1981); Comment, The Limited Liability Company Act, 11 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 387 (1983). Limited partnership associations, which exist in Michigan, New Jersey,
Ohio, and Pennsylvania, also possess the desired feature of limited liability and can be structured
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The Service's willingness to bestow partnership status to the LLC
legitimizes for the first time an entity combining the tax advantages
of a partnership with the limited liability advantages commonly as-
sociated with corporations.
Part II of this article discusses the Service's regulations and other
authorities for classifying organizations as associations taxable as cor-
porations or partnerships and focuses on the application of these au-
thorities to Revenue Ruling 88-76 and the statutory provisions of the
Wyoming and Florida acts. 10 Part III summarizes the powers and
requirements of LLCs, as well as possible business problems concern-
ing LLCs.11 Part IV explores different types of ventures in which
businesspersons might consider using an LLC instead of the traditional
entity normally chosen for that venture.12 When compared to a general
partnership, the benefits offered by the LLC are probably more per-
ceived than real. However, choosing an LLC in this situation is un-
likely to cause problems or pose significant disadvantages.13 This part
then explains why the LLC should never be chosen for certain ventures
that traditionally are conducted in larger limited partnerships. 14 Fi-
nally, this part of the article compares the LLC to two other business
forms - certain smaller limited partnerships and Subchapter S Cor-
porations. Here, the choice of an LCC may provide distinct advantages
over those two entities.a The last part of the article analyzes the
effect of the LLC's absolute limited liability feature on certain operat-
ing rules of Subchapter K.16
to lack two of the three remaining corporate characteristics. See Priv. Ltr. Rul. 7,505,290,310A
(May 29, 1975) (available on WESTLAW) (Michigan partnership association was classified as a
partnership for tax purposes providing that its creation and conduct were in "substantial com-
pliance" with all state statutes pertaining to limited partnerships"). These are seldom used
because of restrictions requiring either the principal place of business or the principal office to
be maintained in the state of organization. See MICH. COATP. LAWS ANN. § 449.301 (West
1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-1 (West 1940 & Supp. 1982); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1783.01
(Anderson 1984); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 172 (Purdon 1984 & Supp. 1989). Michigan, New
Jersey, and Ohio require at least three persons to form a limited partnership association and
Ohio limits the number of members to twenty-five. See MICH. Comip. LAWS ANN. § 5409.301
(West 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:3-1 (West 1940 & Supp. 1982); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §
1783.01 (Anderson 1984).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 17-125.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 126-50.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 151-244.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 151-61.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 162-69.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 170-244.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 245-333.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
II. CLASSIFICATION OF THE LLC AS A PARTNERSHIP
OR AN ASSOCIATION TAXABLE AS A CORPORATION
FOR FEDERAL INCOME TAX PURPOSES
The Service has the power to classify unincorporated 7 organizations
and treat them for tax purposes as associations taxable as corporations,
partnerships, or trusts based on whether the organization possesses
or lacks certain characteristics set out in the regulations. s The fact
that the organization is treated as a partnership or trust under state
law generally does not protect it from being classified as an association
taxable as a corporation. 19
If an unincorporated organization more closely resembles a corpo-
ration than a partnership or a trust, the Service treats the organization
as an association, and taxes it as a corporation. 20 The regulations
17. The regulations only address classifying domestic unincorporated organizations as asso-
ciations taxable as corporations. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983). No
example was discovered in which a domestic incorporated entity was not treated as a corporation
for tax purposes. Arguably, a corporation always possesses three out of four of the corporate
characteristics. A corporation always possesses the corporate characteristic of continuity of life
because it continues until it is formally liquidated or otherwise dissolved. See REVISED MODEL
BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 2.03(a), 14.02, .20, .30 (1985). A corporation always possesses the
corporate characteristic of limited liability because shareholders are not liable for corporate
liabilities unless the corporate veil is pierced. See id. § 6.22. All corporations must either have
a formal board of directors or set forth in the articles of incorporation who will informally
perform the duties of the Board. See id. § 8.01. Consequently, one could argue corporations
always possess centralized management. This argument becomes weaker when the corporation
is closely held or has a single shareholder where in fact all the shareholders are actually managing
the business. Generally, shares of stock are freely transferable. Shareholders can and often do
impose restrictions on transferability through the articles of incorporation, the by-laws or other-
wise by a separate shareholders' agreement. See id. § 6.27. But see Rev. Rul. 88-8, 1988-1 C.B.
403 (all entities organized or incorporated under foreign law must have at least three of the
four corporate characteristics to be treated as an association taxable as a corporation for U.S.
purposes). In other words, the Service will treat foreign corporations as partnerships for U.S.
purposes if they lack two of the four corporate characteristics.
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (as amended in 1977).
19. Id. However, the last sentence of Treasury Regulation § 301.7701-1(c) makes it clear
that local law will determine whether an organization possesses or lacks a particular characteris-
tic. Id.
20. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983). An unexpected determination of
corporate status can have disastrous tax consequences. For example, losses flow through partner-
ships but do not flow through corporations. See I.R.C. § 11 (West Supp. 1989); I.R.C. §§ 701,
702(a) (1986). The Code taxes corporations (except Subchapter S Corporations which are dis-
cussed at infra notes 211-44) at the corporate level and the shareholder level, while only the
partners of a partnership are subject to tax. See I.R.C. §§ 11, 301 (West Supp. 1989); I.R.C.
§ 701, 702(a) (1986). Partnerships, but not corporations, are entitled to certain inside basis
adjustments. See I.R.C. § 734, 743(b) (1986). Both the partnership and the partner can generally
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identify six characteristics indicative of corporate status: (1) associates,
(2) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains, (3) continuity
of life, (4) centralization of management, (5) limited liability, and (6)
free transferability of interests. 21 Whether a particular organization
possesses or lacks these characteristics is a facts-and-circumstances
test .2 The Service treats an unincorporated organization as a corpora-
tion for tax purposes if it has more corporate characteristics than
partnership or trust characteristics.2
defer unrealized gain when distributing appreciated property. See id. §§ 731, 732, 733. Corpo-
rations, however, must recognize gain when appreciated property is distributed and shareholders
generally have a taxable dividend equal to the fair market value of the property received. See
I.R.C. §§ 301, 311 (West. Supp. 1989). Additionally, corporations are subject to the alternative
minimum tax if book income is higher than taxable income; the book income preference, however,
does not apply to partnerships. See id. § 56(f). Income allocated from a partnership will sometimes
qualify as passive income while dividends are always treated as portfolio income. See id. §§
469(e), (h); Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.469 2T(c)(3) and 1.469-2T(e), 53 Fed. Reg. 15,494 (1988).
21. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983).
22. Id. The Service may consider other factors not listed in the regulations in determining
if a particular organization is a corporation, a partnership, or a trust. Id. For a list of items
that the Service will not consider as "other factors" in classifying an organization as a limited
partnership or an association taxable as a corporation, see Rev. Rul. 79-106, 1979-1 C.B. 448,
23. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1983); see also Morrissey v. Commissioner,
296 U.S. 344 (1935). In Morrissey, the taxpayers created a trust under local law, to develop a
golf course for profit. Id. at 360-61. The trustee had broad management powers, the beneficial
interests were freely transferable, liability was limited to the trust's assets, and the death of
a trustee or a beneficiary did not terminate the trust. Id. The Supreme Court held that this
trust was an association taxable as a corporation long before the Service promulgated the entity
classification regulations.
Treasury Regulations discuss when an organization will be classified as a trust rather than
an association or a partnership. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (as amended in 1983); Treas. Reg. §
301.77014 (as amended in 1986). The very essence of a trust is to take property for the purpose
of protecting it or conserving it for the beneficiaries. The Service will classify trusts which fail
to possess either the corporate characteristic of associates or an objective to carry on business
and divide the gains as trusts for tax purposes. If the trust has associates, and an objective to
carry on business and divide the gains, the Service will treat it as an association taxable as a
corporation or a partnership for tax purposes. A trust that has these two characteristics will
be characterized as a corporation if it possesses at least three of the four remaining corporate
characteristics. Otherwise, the Service will classify it as a partnership. Id. See also Rev. Rul.
88-79, 1988-2 C.B. 361 (trust formed under Missouri law for the purpose of buying, holding and
selling oil and gas royalty interests classified as a partnership because it had associates and a
business objective but lacked at least two of the remaining four corporate characteristics); W.
MCKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND
PARTNERS, 3.09 (1977) [hereinafter TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS] (citing several examples
of cases and rulings where trusts were reclassified as partnerships or corporations for federal
income tax purposes).
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
In determining whether an organization possesses a greater
number of corporate versus noncorporate characteristics, the Service
does not consider characteristics common to both types of the organi-
zations being compared. 24 For example, in determining corporate ver-
sus partnership status, the Service does not consider the characteristic
of associates, and the characteristic of a business objective and the
division of gains because both partnerships and corporations possess
these characteristics.2 Thus, an organization seeking partnership clas-
sification need only lack two of the remaining four corporate charac-
teristics to qualify as a partnership. In other words, the regulations
treat an organization as a partnership for federal income tax purposes,
even though it possesses two of the four characteristics indigenous to
corporations.?
A. Continuity of Life
As noted, continuity of life is a characteristic uniquely indicative
of corporate status. Continuity of life exists when the organization
does not cease merely because one or more of its original owners dies,
retires, resigns, or suffers insanity, bankruptcy, or expulsion.2 Con-
tinuity of life is a corporate characteristic because an incorporated
entity continues to survive until formal liquidation. This is so even in
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a)(3) (as amended in 1983).
25. Id.
26. Id. Under § 301.7701-3 of the Treasury Regulations, an organization, collective group,
or other relationship (such as employer/employee or independent contractor, landlord/tenant,
co-owners of property and lender/borrower) which is not a partnership for state law purposes
can be classified as a partnership for tax purposes. Id. § 301.7701-3 (1967). A relationship will
rise to the level of a partnership where the parties have joined together to earn a profit. Id.
Merely sharing expenses or co-owning property does rise to the level of a partnership. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.761-1(a) (as amended in 1972); see also Farley Realty Corp. v. Commissioner,
279 F.2d 701 (2d Cir. 1960) (participating loan held to be a partnership interest); Bussing v.
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 449 (1987) (purported lease held to be a partnership arrangement);
Wheeler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883 (1978) (service provider held to be a partner
even though the other partner bore all the losses and no partnership tax returns were filed);
Rev. Rul. 75-374, 1975-2 C.B. 261 (discussing how co-owners can avoid being partners). For an
exhaustive discussion and numerous examples and citations concerning how partnerships are
distinguished from these other relationships, see TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS, supra note
23, at 3.01-.04.
The Code and the regulations allow certain unincorporated organizations to elect to be
excluded from all or certain portions of Subchapter K if certain requirements are met. I.R.C.
§ 761(a) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.761-2(b) (as amended in 1972). For an extensive discussion of
the procedure for making this election and the requirements that must be met, see TAXATION
OF PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 23, 3.05.
27. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1983).
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cases of death, retirement, resignation, insanity, bankruptcy, or expul-
sion of one of the original owners. If the organization dissolves due
to one of these events, it lacks continuity of life.2
Taxpayers have always found it easy to create a partnership lacking
continuity of life. The regulations recognize that partnerships or-
ganized under the Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"),30 the model act
for organizing general partnerships, and the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act including the 1985 amendments ("RULPA"), 31 the
model act for organizing limited partnerships, automatically lack con-
tinuity of life. 2 Many prospective joint venturers who seek partnership
classification simply arrange to form the partnership in a jurisdiction
where the state's partnership laws correspond to the UPA or RULPA.
The partnership still can lack continuity of life if the taxpayers do not
organize in a UPA or RULPA jurisdiction. If such partnership is a
general partnership, the operative documents must require the
partnership to dissolve if one of these dissolution events occurs with
respect to any partner, unless all remaining partners agree to continue
the business.? If such partnership is a limited partnership, the opera-
tive documents must require the partnership to dissolve if one of these
dissolution events occurs with respect to a general partner unless all
remaining general partners agree to continue the business.3
28. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT §§ 2.03(a), 14.02, 14.20, 14.30 (1985).
29. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1) (as amended in 1983).
30. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1914).
31. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT (1985).
32. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1983). The Uniform Limited Partnership
Act was first codified in 1916. Substantial changes were made in the Revised Uniform Limited
Partnership Act, codified first in 1976 and then amended in 1985. References in this article to
the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act will refer to the latest version, with the 1985
amendments, unless explicitly stated otherwise. The UPA provides that dissolution results from
the death, retirement, resignation, insanity, bankruptcy or expulsion of any of the partners
unless all remaining partners agree to continue the business. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§
29-32, 38(2)(b) (1914). RULPA provides that dissolution results if one of these events occurs
with respect to a general partner unless the certificate provides that the remaining general
partners can agree to continue the business. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 801
(19&5). If one of these events occurs with respect to the sole general partner then all remaining
limited partners must consent to the substitution of a new general partner to avoid dissolution
of the partnership. Id.
33. Treas. Reg. §§ 301-7701-2(b)(1), (3) (as amended in 1983).
34. Id. If there is only one general partner, then all remaining limited partners must consent
to substitute a new general partner. General partnerships and limited partnerships with only
one general partner may take steps to avoid dissolution by having all the partners contractually
agree to continue the business, in the case of a general partnership, or substitute a new general
partner, in the case of a limited partnership. If a partner breaches this contract, thereby causing
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
The continuity of life issue is affected by Revenue Procedure 89-
12,- which the Service released shortly after it released Revenue
Ruling 88-76. Revenue Procedure 89-12 redefines 6 the requirements
an organization must satisfy to obtain a partnership classification rul-
ing. The provisions of this new revenue procedure merely relate to
obtaining a ruling from the Service and do not represent substantive
rules for the determination of partnership status as a matter of lawA7
Revenue Procedure 89-12 covers all organizations in which any member
has limited liability for the organization's debts and other obligations.s
If the organization is not a limited partnership under state law, the
references in this revenue procedure to "limited partner" and "general
partner" apply to comparable members. Specifically, "general
partners" for purposes of this revenue procedure are those members
with significant management authority relative to other members.2 9
Under Revenue Procedure 89-12, limited partnerships 40 seeking a
ruling must provide in the partnership agreement that no less than a
majority4' of the limited partners will elect a new general partner to
continue the partnership if a general partner is removed2 from the
the partnership to dissolve, that partner will be liable for damages. Moreover, the partnership
agreement can also provide that if a majority of the partners agree upon the occurrence of one
of the dissolution events to follow the contract, then the other partners are deemed to also
agree unless they affirmatively disagree. Under this scenario, a general partnership or a limited
partnership with only one general partner arguably still lacks continuity of life because one
partner can still cause the partnership to dissolve by refusing to follow the contract.
35. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22.
36. See infra note 180 (discussing the requirements to obtain a partnership classification
ruling before Revenue Procedure 89-12 was released).
37. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 1.03.
38. See id. § 1.02.
39. Id.
40. General partnerships need not be concerned with any of the requirements of Revenue
Procedure 89-12. This revenue procedure only applies if at least one member's liability for the
organization's debts are limited to a determinable amount. See id. All partners in a general
partnership are jointly and severally liable for the partnership's debts. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT §§ 13-15 (1914). Creditors, however, can only hold limited partners liable for a limited
partnership's debts to the extent the limited partners have actually made or promised to make
contributions to the partnership's capital. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303.
41. Majority presumably means more than 50%. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1107 (5th
ed. 1979).
42. By referring to "removal" of a general partner, the Service apparently only intended
to cover the situation where a general partner is involuntarily ousted from the partnership for
some sort of wrongdoing. If there were more than one general partner and one of them merely
withdrew (due to bankruptcy, for example), the other general partners presumably still would
be able to continue the business without the vote of the limited partners, and the partnership
could still be eligible for a ruling that it lacked continuity of life.
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partnership; otherwise, the Service will not rule that the partnership
lacks continuity of life. 43 The Service may still issue a partnership
classification ruling, however, if the organization lacks two of the three
remaining corporate characteristics."
The Service concluded in Revenue Ruling 88-76 that the LLC or-
ganized under the Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act lacked
continuity of life.45 The Wyoming Act 46 provides that an LLC dissolves
at the earlier of: (1) expiration of the period fixed for its duration,
47
(2) the unanimous agreement of the members to terminate, or (3) the
death, retirement, resignation, insanity, bankruptcy or expulsion of a
member, unless all remaining members consent to continue the busi-
ness. 48 Wyoming LLCs will always lack continuity of life because the
dissolution provisions in the Wyoming Act are almost identical to the
dissolution provisions in the UPA.
49
The dissolution provisions in the Florida Limited Liability Company
Act are worded somewhat differently. Under the Florida Act, if the
articles of organization provide a right to continue the business, then
the LLC will not dissolve upon the death, retirement, resignation,
insanity, bankruptcy, or expulsion of a member, even if all the remain-
ing members refuse to consent to continue the business.0 If the articles
43. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.05.
44. Id. § 4 (introduction).
45. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360-61.
46. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (1977).
47. Both Wyoming and Florida LLCs can fix a duration period of up to 30 years. See FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.407(1)(b) (1987); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-15 107(a)(ii) (1977).
48. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-123 (1977). This right must be stated in the articles of
organization. See id. § 17-15-107(a)(viii). The Wyoming dissolution provisions result in business
problems similar to those found in general partnerships and limited partnerships with only one
general partner. For example, members may not want the LLC to dissolve merely because one
member dies or goes bankrupt. The LLC can mitigate this problem by contractually binding
every member to agree to continue the business and providing for members to be deemed to
agree once a majority actually agrees. See supra note 34 and accompanying text. These steps
do not eliminate the problem; one member can still refuse to continue the business, causing a
dissolution, and the other members' only remedy would be to sue for damages under the contract.
Id.
49. See supra note 32.
50. FLA. STAT. § 608.441(c) (1987). The language in the Florida Act explicitly provides
that the LLC will dissolve if one of these dissolution events occurs with respect to any member
"unless the business of the limited liability company is continued by the consent of all the
remaining members or under a right to continue stated in the articles of organization of the
limited liability company." Id. (emphasis added). In other words, the Florida Act explicitly
allows members of a Florida LLC the option of circumventing the requirement that all members
consent to continue the business.
FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
do not state this right to continue, then, like the dissolution provision
in the Wyoming Act, the Florida Act requires all members to consent
to continue the business if one of these dissolution events occurs with
respect to any member.51 When the articles of organization do contain
the right to continue, thereby alleviating the business problems as-
sociated with an unexpected dissolution,52 the Service may well view
a Florida LLC as possessing the corporate characteristic of continuity
of life. The right to continue in this instance would deprive each
member of the power to dissolve the LLC as a matter of law.0
All requirements of Revenue Procedure 89-12, including the re-
quirement, discussed earlier, dealing with continuity of life and relating
to the removal of a general partner, appear to apply to LLCs seeking
a partnership classification ruling.- If a designated manager runs the
LLC, this revenue procedure would presumably require a majority of
the members to concur in removing the manager.5 If the LLC does
not designate a manager and no member has significantly more man-
51. Id.
52. See supra notes 34, 48 and accompanying text.
53. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(3) (as amended in 1983); see also Comment, The Limited
Liability Company Act, supra note 9, at 396 n.67 (where this concern has been expressed);
Seemann, The Florida Limited Liability Company, 57 FLA. B.J. 536, 537 (1983) (implying
that Florida LLCs lack continuity of life even if the right to continue is stated in the articles).
The legislative history of the Florida Act indicates that Florida LLCs were designed to be
classified as partnerships. This implies that Florida LLCs were intended to lack continuity of
life because the committee acknowledged that a Florida LLC would always possess limited
liability and may or may not possess centralized management. See STAFF REPORT TO COMM!xIT-
TEE OF INSURANCE OF FLORIDA ON H.B. 43 (1982), reprinted in 1982 FLA. LAWS 82-177.
But see Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,937,010 (June 16, 1989), where the Service ruled that a Florida LLC
is classified as a partnership because it lacks continuity of life and free transferability of interests.
The Service explicitly states that continuity of life is lacking because no right to continue the
business is stated in the articles of organization. Id. Consequently, all members must consent
to continue the business if any member ceases to be a member. This ruling strongly implies
that Florida LLCs containing this right to continue the business in its articles of organization
will be treated by the Service as possessing continuity of life. A Florida LLC can substantially
reduce its risk of possessing continuity of life by not providing for an absolute right to continue
the business, by contractually binding all the members to vote to continue the business, and
by deeming all members to have constructively agreed once a majority of members have agreed.
See supra notes 34, 48 and accompanying text.
54. In an LLC, no member has unlimited liability for the LLC's debts. See infra notes
93-94 and accompanying text. Revenue Procedure 89-12 explicitly states that "general partner"
refers to those with significant management power and "limited partner" refers to those without
management power if the entity is not organized under a formal state limited partnership act.
See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 1.02.
55. Id. § 4.05. LLCs can explicitly provide for designated managers to run the business.
See infra text accompanying notes 71-74.
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agement rights than the others,5 arguably Revenue Procedure 89-12
does not apply at all.57 Moreover, it seems unnecessary to apply a
management removal requirement to an LLC seeking a ruling that
continuity of life is lacking. This is because, unlike limited partners
in limited partnerships,58 and like general partnerships in UPA juris-
dictions, LLCs dissolve on the death, retirement, resignation, insanity,
bankruptcy, or expulsion of any member unless all remaining members
agree to continue the business. 59 An LLC seeking a partnership clas-
sification ruling should be able to rely solely on the similarity of its
dissolution provisions to those of the UPA to establish that it lacks
continuity of life.6
B. Centralized Management
Also indicative of corporate status is centralized management. An
organization possesses centralized management if designated persons
have the exclusive authority to make business decisions without con-
sulting the owners.6 1 By its nature, a corporation possesses centralized
management via a board of directors or the equivalent which runs the
business and makes management decisions for the true owners - the
shareholders. 2 For unincorporated organizations, however, centralized
management is less readily discernible. The regulation section at
301.7701-2(c) treat an unincorporated organization as having cen-
tralized management if any person or group that does not include all
of the owners has the exclusive authority to make the business and
management decisions.1 General partnerships organized in states with
56. Generally, LLCs vest management authority in all members in proportion to their
capital contributions. See infra text accompanying note 73. If one member contributed signifi-
cantly more capital than the others, that member would have significantly more management
rights than the others even if no manager was designated. Id.
57. If no member has significantly more management rights than the others, they are all
"general partners" and consequently there are no "limited partners" by analogy. See Rev. Proc.
89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 1.02.
58. If one of these dissolution events occurs with respect to a limited partner, the partnership
is never dissolved. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 801 (1985); supra note 32
and accompanying text.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53.
60. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361; see also supra note 49 and accompanying text.
61. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1983).
62. See id. But see MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.01(c) (1985) (corporation having 50
or fewer shareholders may dispense with a board of directors).
63. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(1) (as amended in 1983). Such persons that possess the
exclusive authority to manage the business can either be designated owners of the organization
or outsiders retained solely to manage the business. See id. § 301.7701-2(c)(2). Centralized
management can exist either when the managers are elected to office from time to time or
when the position of running the business is self-perpetuating. See id.
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general partnership acts corresponding to the UPA automatically will
lack centralized management because all partners have equal rights to
manage the partnership and conduct its business.6 Regulations also pro-
vide that limited partnerships organized in states with limited partner-
ship acts corresponding to RULPA lack centralized management un-
less the limited partners own substantially all the interests in the
partnership.
Under Revenue Procedure 89-12, the Service will not rule that a
limited partnership lacks centralized management unless the limited
partners in the aggregate own no more than eighty percent of the
total interests in the partnership.6 In other words, the general
partners must own at least twenty percent of the partnership interest
or the Service will treat the partnership as possessing centralized
management. 67 Again, failure to meet this standard only means the
Service will not rule that the partnership lacks centralized manage-
64. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983); see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 18(e) (1914). Partners in general partnerships can agree among themselves to vest
management rights in a select few. See, e.g., Endsley v. Game-Show Placements, Ltd., 401
N.E.2d 768, 770-1 (Ind. App. 3d Dist. 1980); In re Lester, 87 Misc. 2d 717, 386 N.Y.S.2d 509,
513 (1976). Even if such agreement exists, normally the act of any partner within the scope of
partnership business binds all partners because these agreements are ineffective against outsiders
who have no notice. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
65. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983). The regulations do not clearly
define how much the limited partners can own before they will be treated as owning "substantially
all" the interests in the partnership. The regulations contain examples where centralized man-
agement was found to exist when the general partners owned only 5.7% and 2.9% of the
partnership interests. See id. § 301.7701-2(c)(4)-3(b)(2) exs. 1 & 2 (as amended in 1967). One
could interpret the regulations and Revenue Procedure 89-12 to mean that it is possible to lack
centralized management if the general partners own more than 5.7%, even if they own less
than 20% of the partnership interests. Obviously, relying on this interpretation would not provide
certainty for the organization, particularly if lacking centralized management was crucial to the
organization's classification as a partnership. The Tax Court has stated that centralized manage-
ment does not exist if the general partner has a '"meaningful proprietary interest" in the partner-
ship. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 177 (1976), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1. (discussed infra
notes 88, 111). This statement does not provide much certainty either. The regulations also
provide that if all or a group of limited partners may remove a general partner, for reasons
other than wrong doings such as gross negligence, self-dealing, or embezzelment, then all the
facts and circumstances must be taken into account to determine whether the partnership
possesses centralized management, see Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
66. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.06. Limited partnership interests owned
by general partners are excluded from the 80% calculation. The Service states that it will
carefully examine all facts and circumstances to make sure that the limited partners do not
control the general partner. Id.
67. See id. The requirement that the general partner own at least 20% of the partnership
is for ruling purposes only. Id. § 1.03.
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ment: the partnership still can obtain a partnership classification ruling
if it can show that it lacks two of the three remaining corporate
characteristics.a
The Service apparently focuses on the percentage of the partner-
ship owned by the limited partners when determining centralized man-
agement because state law prohibits limited partners from participat-
ing in the management of the limited partnership. If limited partners
participate in the control of the business on behalf of other partners,
the courts will not respect their status as limited partners and will
expose them to unlimited liability. 9 The regulations seem to presume
that centralized management must exist if the limited partners own
substantially all of the partnership interests because the general part-
ner must be managing the business primarily for the true owners -
the limited partners.7 If the general partner owns a meaningful in-
terest in the limited partnership, however, centralized management
does not exist. In this situation, the Service presumably views the
general partner as managing the business primarily for itself as a true
owner and only secondarily for the limited partners.
Both the Wyoming 71 and Florida acts- offer flexible alternatives
for managing an LLC. Generally, the power to manage the LLC vests
in the members in proportion to their capital contributions; con-
sequently, LLCs generally lack centralized management.- If the arti-
cles of organization so provide, however, the shareholders may elect
a manager or managers in the manner provided in the operating agree-
ment. 74 In Revenue Ruling 88-76, designated managers ran the Wyom-
68. See id. § 4 (introduction).
69. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (1985). Certain activities are listed
in § 303(b) that limited partners can engage in without being treated as participating in the
control of the business. Such activities include: being an employee or agent of, or contractor
for, the limited partnership or the general partner; consulting with or advising the general
partner concerning the partnership's business; acting as a surety for the limited partnership;
approving or disapproving an amendment to the partnership agreement; and voting on certain
listed extraordinary matters. Id. § 303(b).
70. RULPA provides that the general partner of a limited partnership has the same man-
agement rights and is exposed to the same liabilities as all partners in general partnerships.
Id. § 403. In other words, for state law purposes the general partners are the only partners
intended to manage the business.
71. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-116 (1977).
72. FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (1987).
73. Id. at § 608.422; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15 116 (1977). These provisions strongly
resemble a similar provision in the UPA. If the members manage the business according to
their capital contributions, then by definition, the organization lacks centralized management
because no person is making decisions on behalf of the true owners. See supra text accompanying
notes 61-64.
74. FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-116 (1977).
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ing LLC and the Service treated the entity as possessing the corporate
characteristic of centralized management. 7
The Service will probably treat LLCs that have designated mana-
gers as lacking centralized management if the designated managers
own enough of an interest in the LLC.76 Revenue Procedure 89-12
considers the managers as "general partners" and the nonmanagers
as "limited partners" by analogy when applying the percentage own-
ership tests.7 If the managers own at least twenty percent of the
LLC, the Service should rule that the LLC lacks centralized manage-
ment. 7 Moreover, if the managers own a meaningful proprietary in-
terest in the LLC, the LLC should lack centralized management as
a matter of substantive law.79
The designated managers in Revenue Ruling 88-76 were three of
the LLC shareholders.80 The Service did not reveal how much of the
LLC the managers owned when it held that the Wyoming LLC pos-
sessed centralized management. 81
C. Limited Liability
A major advantage of doing business in corporate form is the
privilege of having liability for debts and obligations of the business
limited to the actual and promised contributions to the business; cre-
ditors cannot proceed against the owner's personal assets such as
houses and automobiles. An organization possesses the corporate
characteristic of limited liability if no member is personally liable for
the debts or claims against the organization. Simply put, a creditor
cannot proceed against any member's personal assets if the organiza-
75. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
76. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.
77. Id. §§ 1.02, 4.06. If the designated managers are not members of the LLC, see infra
note 156 and accompanying text, the LLC will always possess centralized management because
the members, as "limited partners" by analogy, will be treated as owning all the interests in
the LLC. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, §§ 1.02, 4.06.
78. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, §§ 1.02, 4.06. If the LLC had no designated
managers it would always lack centralized management under the rule of Revenue Procedure
89-12 because the "general partners" would own 100% of the interests. See id.
79. See supra note 65.
80. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
81. See id. at 361.
82. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.22 (1988). Commentators have iden-
tified the limited liability feature as the primary business advantage for choosing the corporate
form. See Berle, The Theory of Enterprise Entity, 47 COLUM. L. REv. 343 (1947). But see
infra text accompanying notes 189-95 (discussing when shareholders may be liable for corporate
debts under the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil).
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tion's assets are insufficient to satisfy the claim. 3 If an organization
is to lack limited liability, at least one member must have unlimited
liability for all the organization's debts.8
All partners in a general partnership organized under state laws
corresponding to the UPA are jointly and severally liable for all claims
against the partnership.5 Consequently, a general partnership or-
ganized in a UPA jurisdiction always lacks the corporate characteristic
of limited liability.8 6 General partners of a limited partnership or-
ganized in a RULPA jurisdiction are also jointly and severally liable
for all claims against the partnershipY The regulations treat a partner-
ship organized under state laws corresponding to the RULPA as lack-
ing the corporate characteristic of limited liability unless the general
partner is merely a dummy agent for the limited partners and has no
substantial assets that the partnership's creditors can reach.s
Limited partnerships seeking to minimize the general partner's
liability for debts of the partnership often will arrange to have a
corporation serve as the general partner. Revenue Procedure 89-12
provides a safe harbor for establishing that a limited partnership with
one or more corporate general partners lacks limited liability. The
Service automatically will rule that the partnership lacks limited liabil-
ity if the net worth of the corporate general partners equals at least
ten percent of the total contributions to the partnership and is expected
to continue at such level throughout the life of the partnership.- If
the partnership cannot meet that standard, it must demonstrate that
83. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (as amended in 1983).
84. Id.
85. See id.; UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 13-15 (1914).
86. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (as amended in 1983).
87. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 403(b) (1985).
88. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d)(2) (as amended in 1983). The Tax Court has held that the
general partner will be treated as having unlimited liability for the partnerships debts if it either
has substantial assets or it is not a mere dummy agent of the limited partners. Larson v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1. In Larson, the court treated the general
partner as having unlimited liability because it was involved substantially in the partnership's
business affairs. Id. The court specifically noted that, although it was doubtful this general
partner had substantial assets, the presence of substantial assets is not necessary if the general
partner is not a mere dummy agent. Id. at 180-81.
89. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.
90. Id. § 4.07. See also Gen. Couns. Mere. 39,798 (Oct. 18, 1989) (stating that contributions do
not include deemed contributions for a partners share of partnership liabilities under § 752(a)
and "net worth" does not include the value of the limited partnership; if the corporation is a
general partner in more than one limited partnership, details are provided to prevent double
counting of the corporation's assets).
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either the general partners collectively have "substantial assets" or
the general partners will act independently of the limited partners.91
Although the language of Revenue Procedure 89-12 is somewhat con-
fusing, failure to meet one of these standards will not result in the
denial of a partnership classification ruling if the partnership can show
it lacks two of the three remaining corporate characteristics. A limited
partnership still can obtain a partnership classification ruling if it pos-
sesses the corporate characteristic of limited liability.92
Both the Wyomingr and Florida acts9 provide that no member or
manager of the LLC is liable for the LLC's debts; creditors can only
force members and managers to pay what they have agreed to contrib-
ute to the LLC's capital. It is therefore not surprising that the Service
found, in Revenue Ruling 88-76, that the Wyoming LLC possessed
the corporate characteristic of limited liability.
9 5
The Service should always treat an LLC as possessing the corpo-
rate characteristic of limited liability, and the tests for determining
limited liability set out in Revenue Procedure 89-12 should be irrelev-
ant to an LLC seeking a partnership classification ruling.9 If members
91. Id. The Service will closely scrutinize the parties' arrangement to determine whether
one of these two alternatives are met. Id. A recent General Counsel Memorandum states that
general partners seeking to prove independence from the limited partners usually must show
(1) there is insignificant influence or control by the limited partners; (2) the general partner's
contributions are much larger than is required by §§ 4.03 or 4.04 of Rev. Proc. 89-12; (3) the
general partner is allocated a much larger profits interest than is required by 88 4.01 or 4.02
of Rev. Proc. 89-12; and (4) the general partner has "significant" net worth. Gen. Couns. Mem.
39,798 (Oct. 18, 1989).
92. The introduction to § 4 of Revenue Procedure 89-12 provides that a taxpayer must
satisfy all conditions of § 4 to obtain a partnership classification ruling. Id. § 4 (introduc-
tion). It then states that §§ 4.05 and 4.06, relating to continuity of life and centralized manage-
ment, respectively, refer solely to those characteristics. Id. Failure to meet them will not
preclude a partnership classification ruling overall. Id. Next, it vaguely states that § 4.07
provides a safe harbor generally to limited partnerships with at least one corporate general
partner. Id. See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,798 (Oct. 18, 1989) (Service states that failure to
obtain ruling that limited liability is lacking does not preclude a partnership classification ruling
if it can be shown that the organization lacks two of the remaining four corporate characteristics).
For a discussion of the Service's ruling requirements before the issuance of Rev. Proc. 89-12,
see infra text accompanying notes 179-81.
93. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-113 (1977).
94. FLA. STAT. § 608.436 (1987).
95. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361. As a matter of state law, LLCs will always
possess limited liability. Consequently, for tax purposes, even if the members contractually
assume or guarantee every claim incurred by the LLC, the LLC will still possess the corporate
characteristic of limited liability. It is impossible to negate the limited liability characteristic.
96. Revenue Procedure 89-12's reference to "general partners" as those with significant
management authority relative to other members raises the possibility of applying this test to
a corporate manager. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 1.02.
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with significant management rights or designated managers of the
LLC are individuals, the standards for determining limited liability
in this revenue procedure do not apply.97 If a member with significant
management rights or the designated manager constitute a corpora-
tion, the language of this revenue procedure literally allows those
persons to meet the net-worth or the independent-action tests and
at the same time argue that the LLC lacks limited liability.98 The
Service could not have intended this result when it drafted Revenue
Procedure 89-12. Unlike general partners in limited partnerships,-
state law provides that no member of an LLC has unlimited liability. 1 '
The Service later clarified Revenue Procedure 89-12 and made the
portion dealing with limited liability inapplicable to LLCs, presumably
because it makes no sense to apply any version of a limited liability
test to LLCs. 1°1
D. Free Transferability of Interests
The final corporate characteristic discussed in the entity classifica-
tion regulations is free transferability of interests. For the entity to
possess the corporate characteristic of free transferability of interests,
substantially all of the owners must have the power to transfer, with-
out the consent of any other owner, all attributes of ownership in the
organization to a person not a member of the organization. 02 An un-
limited right to assign only the interest in profits without a right to
participate in management and otherwise exercise full rights of own-
ership does not constitute free transferability of interests.' 03 General
partnerships organized in UPA jurisdictions always lack free transfera-
bility of interests because no person can become a member of the
partnership without the consent of all partners. 10 4
The RULPA contemplates the inclusion of transferability restric-
tions in the limited partnership certificate. 05 Such restrictions can be
97. Section 4.07 of Rev. Proc. 89-12 only applies if one or more of the "general partners"
(the managers, by analogy) are corporations. See id.
98. Id.
99. General partners always have unlimited liability for state law purposes regardless of
how they are treated for tax purposes. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
100. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
101. See Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,798 n.3 (Oct. 18, 1989), which explicitly states that § 4.07
of Rev. Proc. 89-12, the section dealing with obtaining a ruling that limited liability is lacking,
does not apply to state law limited liability companies.
102. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(e) (as amended in 1983).
103. Id.
104. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 18(g) (1914). The transferor can transfer only the
right to share in partnership profits and losses if this consent is not granted. See id. § 27(1).
105. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT §§ 702, 704(b) (1985).
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likened to the power of corporate shareholders to include restrictions
on stock transfers in corporate articles or bylaws.1° Unlike the UPA,
the RULPA does not impose restrictions on transferability as a matter
of law.107 If the limited partnership certificate or agreement does not
impose restrictions on transferability, the partners are free to transfer
all aspects of ownership, including full membership without the consent
of any other partner.108 Revenue Procedure 89-12 does not provide
standards for avoiding the corporate characteristic of free transferabil-
ity of interests for purposes of obtaining a partnership classification
ruling.10
9
Limited partnerships trying to negate the existence of free trans-
ferability of interests, while still allowing the limited partners
maximum freedom to dispose of their interests, often make all trans-
fers of a full interest in the partnership (rather than merely the
economic rights to share in partnership profits and losses) subject to
the general partner's approval. Under the regulations, the power of
the general partner to "veto" any transfer of a complete partnership
interest causes the partnership to lack free transferability of in-
terests. 110 The Tax Court has held, however, that if the general partner
is prohibited from unreasonably withholding consent, the court will
treat the partnership as possessing the corporate characteristic of free
transferability of interests if no reason exists for the general partner
to block the transfer."'
106. See REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 6.27 (1985).
107. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 702, 704(b) (1985).
108. Id.
109. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. § 22.
110. See Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3(b)(2) Ex. 1 (as amended in 1967). As a practical matter,
it sometimes makes very little difference to a transferee limited partner if the general partner
refuses to consent to the transfer. See infra notes 111, 165, 168 and accompanying text. The
Service has held that limited partners that possess only the economic rights still report their
share of the partnership's income and losses for tax purposes in the same manner as they would
had a complete interest been transferred. See Rev. Rul. 77-137, 1977-1 C.B. 178.
111. See Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159, 183 (1976), acq., 1979-1 C.B. 1 (discussed
supra at notes 65 and 88). Commentators have expressed the view that it is relatively easy for
limited partnerships to avoid possessing free transferability of interests by merely allowing the
general partner to arbitrarily withhold consent for transfers of all attributes of ownership (not
transfers of the economic rights only) in situations where such veto would, as a practical matter,
never be invoked. See TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS, supra note 23, 3.06[4][(d)]. Others have
cautioned practitioners not to rely on this technical distinction between the regulations and
Larson to provide certainty that free transferability does not exist at least when the partnership
at issue is a master limited partnership. For a discussion of this issue, see infra note 169. See
R. Turlington & R. Beeson, Master Limited Partnerships: Current Issues, Techniques and
Strategies 11 n.21 (Feb. 23, 1987) (unpublished paper). The authors presumably believe that
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Both the Wyomingia and Florida acts113 by definition produce an
entity that lacks the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interests. Although members have some flexibility to include provi-
sions concerning transferability in the operating agreement, under no
circumstances will the transferee have the right to participate in the
business affairs or otherwise be a full member in the LLC unless all
members consent to the transfer.14
Revenue Procedure 89-12 contains additional requirements to ob-
tain a partnership classification ruling not directly tied to the four
corporate characteristics discussed above. Usually,"5 the general part-
ners must have in the aggregate a one percent or greater interest in
all material items of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit. 116 The Service will tolerate deviation from this one-percent
standard under only limited circumstances.1 7 The general partners
also must either: (1) maintain a minimum capital account balance 1l8
of one percent of all positive capital account balances or $500,000,
whichever is lessl9 or (2) contribute substantial services where pay-
the larger and more like a corporation the limited partnership is, the less likely the Service
will respect the technical right of the general partner to arbitrarily prevent a full transfer as
grounds to hold that the partnership lacks free transferability. This is particularly true with
larger transactions such as offerings of master limited partnership interests where the documents
will usually imply that there are no restrictions on transferability. These concerns become very
compelling when one considers that a limited partner in a large limited partnership who merely
possesses the economic rights is in virtually the same position as a limited partner with all
attributes of ownership. Both types of limited partners are really mere investors; consequently,
only the economic rights are important. See supra note 110 and infra note 165.
112. Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-122 (1977).
113. FLA. STAT. § 608.432 (1987).
114. Id.; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-122 (1977).
115. In larger limited partnerships, where the total contributions exceed $50 million, the
general partners are not required to have a 1% interest in all the partnership's material items.
The general partner's interest only is required to equal a percentage, equal to one percent
divided by the ratio of total contributions to $50 million. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B.
22, § 4.02.
116. Id. § 4.01.
117. Id. Temporary allocations required by §§ 704(b) and 704(c) will justify deviating
from the one-percent requirement. The Service will view all other deviations as violations of
the requirement unless the limited partnership demonstrates that the general partners have a
material interest in net profits and losses over the anticipated life of the partnership. Id.
118. For a discussion of the definition of a partner's capital account balance, see infra note
309.
119. Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.03. Under certain circumstances, general
partners must make additional capital contributions when limited partners make additional capital
contributions. Id.
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ment for these services will come from allocations of partnership in-
come rather than guaranteed payments.10
Like several other aspects of Revenue Procedure 89-12, 1 the
analysis is awkward when one attempts to apply these additional re-
quirements to LLCs. The "general partners" required to meet these
standards are presumably the designated managers or those members
with significant management rights by virtue of their contributions to
the LLC capital. If the designated managers are not members,M
apparently the LLC cannot obtain a partnership classification ruling.'2
If no designated managers or members with proportionately greater
management exist, the Service could interpret this revenue procedure
to require each member to meet the additional requirements. Alterna-
tively, the Service could disregard this revenue procedure in its en-
tirety because, by analogy, no "limited partners" exist. 12
III. OTHER CHARACTERISTICS OF LLCs
A. Purpose and Registered Offices
Like most entities, taxpayers can organize LLCs for almost any
lawful purpose.1 26 The powers of an LLC are very broad.m More
120. Id. § 4.04. If the general partners are contributing substantial services they must
agree to contribute on termination or dissolution of the partnership the lesser of: any deficit in
their capital account or the excess of 1.01% of the total capital contributed by the limited
partners over capital previously contributed by the general partners'. Id. These extra require-
ments in Rev. Proc. 89-12 that are not directly tied to one of the four corporate characteristics
are presumably to ensure that the general partner has undertaken a minimum participation in
the risks and rewards of the business rather than being merely an outside manager.
121. See supra notes 54-58, 96-101 and accompanying text.
122. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 1.02.
123. No prohibition apparently exists forbidding nonmembers from being the designated
managers. See infra text accompanying note 156.
124. If the manager or "general partner" is not a member, the LLC will not meet the one
percent or the capital contribution requirements. See supra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
125. Revenue Procedure 89-12 only applies where liability of any member is limited, and
at least one member exists analogous to a "general partner" who possesses significant manage-
ment authority relative to the other members. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.02.
126. Wyoming LLCs cannot be organized for the purpose of banking or insurance. See
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-103 (1977). Florida LLCs cannot be used for businesses where special
statutes control that type of business and are in conflict with the LLC provisions. FLA. STAT.
§ 608.403 (1987).
127. A Wyoming LLC may, for example: (1) sue or be sued in its own name; (2) purchase,
lease or otherwise deal with real and personal property; (3) sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of
any of its assets or property; (4) lend money to or otherwise assist its members; (5) purchase,
mortgage, vote, dispose of, or otherwise deal with any security or interest in another LLC,
corporation, or partnership; (6) contract for, guarantee, or incur liabilities or issue its own notes;
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importantly, LLCs can do business anywhere.m Consequently, venture
capitalists and business persons seeking to take advantage of the i-
mited liability feature while having their entity classified as a partner-
ship with absolute certainty can form a Wyoming or Florida LLC and
do business anywhere, even if they conduct no business in Wyoming
or Florida. However, both Wyoming and Florida require that the
LLC maintain a registered office and registered agent in the chosen
jurisdiction. 130 The registered agent must be an individual who resides
in the state, a domestic corporation, or a foreign corporation qualified
to do business in the state."13 The registered office need not be the
same as the LLC's place of business, but such office must be identical
to the registered agent's business office. 132 Persons seeking to form
an LLC without doing business in Wyoming or Florida would need
to find a person in the state, a corporate service company, for example,
to serve as its agent and business office, presumably for a fee.
B. Persons and Contributions
Two or more persons may form an LLC. 1 In both Wyoming and
Florida a person includes virtually any type of entity."3 Contributions
(7) elect or appoint managers or agents; (8) become a member of a general or limited partnership,
joint venture or any other limited liability company. Wyo. STAT. ANN., § 17-15-104 (1977).
The powers of Florida LLCs are similarly broad. See FLA. STAT. § 608.404 (1987).
128. Wyoming allows an LLO the power to "[c]onduct its business, carry on its operations
and have and exercise the powers granted by this act in any state, territory, district or possession
of the United States, or in any foreign country . . . ." Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-104(a)(viii)
(1977). Similarly, a Florida LLC may "[c]onduct its business, carry on its operations and have
offices, and exercise the powers granted by this chapter within or without this state." FLA.
STAT. § 608.404(7) (1987).
129. One of the purposes behind the enactment of the Florida Act was to attract foreign
investment and encourage businesses to move to Florida. See Comment, supra note 9, at 387
88 nn.3 & 5, (citing tape recordings of proceedings in the Florida legislature at the time the
Florida Act was discussed and passed). One commentary has claimed that the reason for enacting
the Wyoming Act was to provide an attractive vehicle for conducting business ventures and
real estate transactions all over the United States through Wyoming LLCs. The legislature
anticipated that Wyoming would benefit from the revenues of filing fees and business activities
to maintain nominal places of business and registered agents in Wyoming, much like the State
of Delaware benefits from out-of-state businesses incorporating under its laws. See Burke &
Sessions, supra note 9, at 235.
130. FLA. STAT. § 608.415 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-110 (1977).
131. FLA. STAT. § 608.415 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-110 (1977).
132. FLA. STAT. § 608.415 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-110 (1977).
133. FLA. STAT. § 608.405 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-106 (1977). An LLC must
have at least two members; no limitations exist on how many members above two. FLA. STAT.
§ 608.405 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-106 (1977).
134. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.402(4); 1.01(3) ("person" includes 'individuals, children, firms, as-
sociations, joint adventures, partnerships, estates, trusts, business trusts, syndicates, fiduciaries,
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to capital of the LCC by a member can only consist of cash or other
property. Members cannot contribute services to the LLC for a capital
interest. 13 No comparable restriction exists, however, preventing an
LLC member from contributing services for an interest in profits.
136
A possible reason for not allowing LLC members to contribute services
for a capital interest is to prevent a member from claiming credit in
its capital account for services of questionable value or for services
the member may not have performed at all.
137
corporations, and all other groups or combinations"); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-102(a)(iv) (1977)
("person" includes "individuals, general partnerships, limited partnerships, limited liability com-
panies, corporations, trusts, business trusts, real estate investments, trusts, estates and other
associations").
135. FLA. STAT. § 608.4211 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-115 (1977). It is not always
clear whether property or services are being contributed. Partners receiving an interest in
partnership capital will always argue that they have contributed property rather than services,
because of the undesirable tax consequences which result if services are contributed. See infra
note 137. It may be considered reasonable to rely on the authorities in the partnership area
when deciding if an LLC member contributed property or services for an interest in the LLC's
capital. See United States v. Stafford, 727 F.2d 1043, 1052 (11th Cir. 1984) (letter of intent was
property because it was analogous to goodwill which had been always treated as property);
Stafford v. United States, 611 F.2d 990, 995-96 n.6 (5th Cir. 1980) (letter of intent held not
property because the contract was not binding); United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d 487, 490
(5th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 961 (1965) (maps showing where oil could be found held
to be property).
136. See FLA. STAT. § 608.4211 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-115 (1977).
137. Partners, however, are permitted to contribute services to their partnerships in ex-
change for an interest in partnership capital. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(a) and REVISED
UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 501 (containing no language that would prohibit partners from
contributing services for an interest in partnership capital). Partners generally do not elect to
do so because of the undesirable tax consequences. Section 721 and the regulations will not
shield the partner from recognizing gain when services are contributed for a capital interest.
Consequently, the service-providing partner will often recognize immediate ordinary income
under § 61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960). If the partner contributes services and the
receipt of the capital interest is contingent or otherwise subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture
then the timing of service-providing partner's income will be determined under the rules of §
83. See § 83(a) and Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) (1978) (provides generally that a service provider is
not taxed on property received for such services until such property is no longer subject to a
substantial risk of forfeiture or is freely transferable); see also I.R.C. § 351(d)(1) (West Supp.
1989) (nonrecognition rules for contributions to corporations in exchange for the corporation's
stock do not apply if services are contributed).
A service-contributing partner is not taxed under §§ 61 and 83 if a mere interest in partnership
profits is received. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960) (parenthetical language suggests that
the rule requiring income recognition if services are contributed for a capital interest does not
apply if a share in partnership profits is received); Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,346 (July 23, 1975)
(suggesting that if, in fact, the interest received is a pure profits interest rather than a hidden
interest in partnership capital then the receipt of the profits interest will not be taxable on
receipt even if it can be readily valued); see also National Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M.
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C. Division of Profits and Losses
Both Wyoming and Florida acts explicitly permit the members to
divide the LLC's profits and losses any way they see fit.l3 Con-
sequently, these laws allow members of LLCs the same flexibility
that partners in partnerships enjoy to allocate income and losses for
tax purposes. 39 For example, an LLC could provide in the articles of
organization for certain members to contribute major parts of the
capital, while other members contribute services for an interest in the
LLC's profits. Once the capital contributing members recover their
capital, the LLC can allocate a disproportionate share of the profits
to the service contributing members.140
D. Other Considerations
Except for the dissolution provisions,1 41 the language in the Wyom-
ing and Florida acts is very similar and substantively produces almost
identical entities."' Organizing the LLC in Florida versus Wyoming
does raise different state tax considerations. Wyoming imposes no
state income tax on individuals and apparently does not tax LLCs at
the entity level.'" The Florida Act, however, explicitly taxes Florida
LLCs as corporations for state tax purposes and classifies distributions
to its members as dividends for state tax purposes.'"
(CCH) 1223 (1986); Kenroy, Inc. v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 1749 (1984); Wheeler v.
Commissioner, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 883 (1978) (language or facts suggest that services contributed
for a profits interest will not be taxed on receipt). In Diamond v. Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286
(7th Cir. 1974), however, a partner contributed services allegedly for a profits interest and
shortly thereafter sold his partnership interest and recognized substantial gain. Id. at 286-87.
The court held that the gain was ordinary compensation income from the receipt of the profits
interest rather than capital gain from the sale of the partnership interest. Id. at 291. While the
result in Diamond is correct, the reasoning unfortunately causes concern any time a partner
contributes services for a profits interest. A holding that the taxpayer in Diamond, actually
received a hidden capital interest would have produced more consistent law in this area.
138. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.407(j), .423, .426 (1987); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-119, 17-15-107(a)(x)
(1977).
139. See infra notes 273-86, 319-33 and accompanying text (discussing the limitations on
special allocations for tax purposes of the partnership's income and losses).
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 71-75, 93-95, 112-14, 126-40 and accompanying text.
143. Cf. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-2-101 to -2-104 (1977) (franchise tax imposed on corpora-
tions).
144. FLA. STAT. §§ 608.426, .471 (1987). Florida imposes a corporate tax at a rate of 5.5%.
See id. § 220.11(2). For businesses conducted outside the State of Florida, the state imposes
the tax on only the net income apportioned in Florida, (i.e., Florida source income). See id. §
220.16. Even if the LLC has no Florida tax because none of its income is apportioned in Florida,
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The lack of precedent surrounding LLCs may cause some to hesi-
tate before utilizing them. At least one writer has expressed concern
because the law is uncertain as to the circumstances under which
members may dissolve an LLC if a particular member wants to with-
draw its capital contribution. 145 The extent that a member may bind
the LLC and the scope of an outside party's duty to determine that
member's authority are also unclear.146 More importantly, there is
some question as to whether all states will respect the LLC's limited
liability feature. 147 Courts will refuse to recognize the presumption of
comity if the state affirmatively expresses that the LLC is against its
public policy. 14 Consequently, business persons considering the use of
an LLC should review the laws and decisions of the states where the
LLC is doing business to ensure that limited liability for unincorpo-
rated associations is not against the public policy of those states.149
Moreover, the courts have yet to define the extent to which the com-
mon law doctrine of piercing the corporate veil will apply to LLCs.1 °
Although the LLC is an unincorporated entity, if it proves a viable
choice for doing business, courts likely will develop doctrines over
time defining the proper circumstances for disregarding the limited
liability.
IV. BUSINESS SITUATIONS IN WHICH USE OF AN LLC
MIGHT BE CONSIDERED
A. Situations in Which Benefits of LLC Formation
Are More Preceived than Real
As noted above, an LLC can always be structured to be a partner-
ship for federal income tax purposes because it always lacks continuity
of life, free transferability of interests, 51 and, depending on how it is
it still must file a Florida corporate income tax return. See id. § 220.22(1). This could be
administratively cumbersome since the LLC will be filing partnership information returns and
the Form K-1 for federal income tax purposes. Like Wyoming, Florida has no income tax on
natural persons; therefore only corporate members need be concerned about receiving dividends
for state tax purposes. See id. §§ 608.426, .471.
145. See Comment, supra note 9, at 398-400.
146. Id. at 400-01.
147. Id. at 401.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 401-02.
150. For a discussion of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil, see infra text accompany-
ing notes 190-97.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 45-49, 112-14. But cf. supra notes 50-53 (discussing
when Florida LLCs may be viewed as possessing continuity of life).
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structured, centralized management. 152 The Service also treats general
partnerships organized in UPA jurisdictions as partnerships as the
classic general partnership lacks all four of the characteristics indigen-
ous to corporations alone. 15 Initially, the LLC may appear to provide
a more flexible form to conduct a business or venture when a general
partnership would traditionally be chosen. Unlike a general partner-
ship, the members of an LLC always have limited liability unless, as
a business matter, they agree to expose themselves to unlimited lia-
bility with respect to certain debts by either assuming or guaranteeing
these obligations.15 Moreover, LLCs offer more flexible alternatives
managing the business. General partners by law have equal manage-
ment rights, 16 while LLC members can vest management rights in a
select few. Moreover, the Wyoming and Florida acts do not appear
to require those select few to be members of the LLC. 156
The perceived benefits of an LLC over a general partnership di-
minish when one considers that general partners always have been
able to obtain limited liability and centralized management in sub-
stance. General partners who are natural persons need only set up a
wholly-owned S corporation and have the S corporation be the partner.
Under the rules described in Subchapter S, the partnership's tax items
will flow first to the S corporation and then to the ultimate partner.
Only the S corporation, however, will have unlimited liability for the
partnership's debts.157 Corporate partners can be insulated from the
152. See supra text accompanying notes 71-81. A Florida LLC that could be viewed as
possessing continuity of life should be structured to lack centralized management.
153. See supra notes 32, 64, 85, 104 and accompanying text.
154. See infra notes 247, 287 and accompanying text.
155. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
156. But see supra text accompanying notes 121-25 (indicating Revenue Procedure 89-12
may preclude a classification ruling if the manager is not a member). Both the Wyoming and
Florida acts exTlicitly provide that management may be vested in the person or persons that
have been elected by the members pursuant to the LLC's operating agreement. Such elections
must be held annually. FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-116 (1977). If
only members were intended to be managers it seems that the statutes would either so provide
or refer to the "managers" as members that have been elected to manage the LLC. See also
FLA. STAT. § 608.422 (1987) (providing for the election of managers by the LLC's articles of
organization, as opposed to vesting management in the members by law); Wyo. STAT. ANN.
§ 17-15-113 (1977); FLA. STAT. § 608.436 (1987) (providing that "[n]either the members .. .
nor the managers" have unlimited liability for claims against the LLG). The fact that the statutes
explicitly provide for managers implies that there can be managers that are not members of
LLC. Under the facts of Rev. Rul. 88-76, however, the designated managers were members.
See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 360.
157. See infra text accompanying notes 211-44 (discussing S corporations). Partners seeking
to insulate liability by interposing a corporation must consider the common law doctrine of
piercing the corporate veil. See infra text accompanying notes 189-95. The threat of having the
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partnership's liabilities by interposing a wholly-owned special purpose
subsidiary between it and the partnership. The subsidiary's losses or
income, which flow through from the partnership, can be used to offset
the corporate partner's income or losses by the filing of a consolidated
return with the subsidiary. 15 Moreover, general partners are free to
contract among themselves concerning management of the partner-
ship. 159 These agreements are ineffective, however, against outsiders
without notice. 160 LLCs are probably better viewed as a less compli-
cated alternative161 to general partnerships in circumstances in which
parties desire features of limited liability or centralized management.
B. Situations in Which an LLC Should Not Be Chosen
The LLC should never be chosen for ventures traditionally con-
ducted in large limited partnerships in which the business includes
many limited partners that do not meet or communicate regularly and
in some cases are unaware of each other's identity. In such situations,
the limited partners usually will require as much freedom as possible
to dispose of their interests in the partnership. LLCs require consent
of all members before a member may transfer all the attributes of
corporate shield disregarded is not likely to be as great in the context of a general partnership,
as opposed to a limited partnership, for several reasons. Disregarding the corporate entity is
equitable in nature and varies depending on the circumstances of each case. See Hackney &
Benson, Shareholder Liability for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. PITr. L. REV. 837, 844 (1982).
Consequently, the use of the corporate form to insulate liability among general partners when
all of them are jointly and severally liable often will not be as great an abuse of the corporate
entity as using a corporation to insulate the only general partner in a limited partnership.
Moreover, the general partners in the aggregate are more likely to produce an adequately
capitalized pool of resources for the creditors to proceed against than a sole corporate general
partner in a limited partnership. Id. at 885.
158. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1502-11, -21 (as amended in 1980). The possibility of special
purpose subsidiaries, used to insulate corporate partners from partnership liabilities, being
disregarded should also not be as risky when used in the general partnership context. See supra
note 157. It has been noted, however, that courts are more willing to disregard the separate
corporateness of a subsidiary, particularly when the parent and the subsidiary are viewed as
having one enterprise. See Berle, supra note 82, at 350; see also Easterbrook & Fishel, Limited
Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 99 (1985). Corporate partners in a
general partnership using a special purpose subsidiary should be especially careful to keep the
subsidiary's business of being a partner separated from the parent. The parent also might
consider capitalizing the subsidiary more generously than the individual counterpart seeking the
same goals by using an S corporation. See Hackney & Benson, supra note 157, at 866.
159. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 9, 18(e) (1914); see supra note 64 and accompanying
text; Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).
160. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(4) (as amended in 1983).




membership in the LLC. 162 Partners can structure a limited partner-
ship, however, with no restrictions on transferability and still retain
partnership status, provided the entity lacks two of the three remain-
ing corporate characteristics. 163
One should note that an LLC's articles can provide that economic
rights, as distinguished from all the attributes of membership, are
transferable without any consent.164 At the same time, limited partner-
ships can lack free transferability of interests without imposing any
limitations on transfers of the economic rights merely by providing
that transfers of all attributes of ownership are subject to the arbitrary
veto of the general partner.'6
When the business involves multiple owners desiring to freely
transfer interests, the right to freely transfer economic rights of LLC
ownership should not encourage use of the LLC form for at least two
practical reasons. First, the limited partners may want the flexibility
of freely transferring all rights of ownership. With an LLC such free-
dom is impossible.'6 In contrast, in a limited partnership, partners
directly can allow this right by omitting restrictions on transferability
from the partnership certificate or agreement. 16 More importantly, in
situations where many owners exist and the right to freely dispose
of the interests is crucial to the business deal, counsel may be uncom-
fortable relying on an entity technically lacking free transferability if
this characteristic is essential to securing partnership status.16 Tra-
162. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
163. See supra text accompanying notes 24-26.
164. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
165. See supra note 110. In larger limited partnerships, the limited partners are usually
passive investors. Consequently, merely imposing limitations on transfers of all attributes of
ownership, while allowing free transferability of the economic rights, will not likely produce a
sound argument that free transferability is lacking in substance. The economic rights in the
partnership confer partner status for tax purposes and limited partners investing in large limited
partnerships will not care about receiving the management rights associated with full member-
ship. Id.
166. See supra text accompanying note 114.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
168. In a larger transaction with many members that are essentially investors, the LLC
would have to appoint a designated manager who typically would own a small percentage of
the LLC, thus causing the LLC to possess centralized management. Because the LLC would
also possess limited liability, it would have to lack free transferability of interests to ensure
partnership status. Under the facts of the Rev. Rul. 88-76, the Wyoming LLC had twenty-five
members and three of those members were the designated managers. See Rev. Rul. 88-76,
1988-2 C.B. 360, 360. Although there were no restrictions in the LLC's articles on the transfer
of the economic rights in the LLC, a transferee could not be a full member in the LLC without
the consent of all members. This LLC was held to be a partnership because it lacked continuity
of life and free transferability of interests. Id. at 361. Arguably, different considerations would
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ditionally, such entities have ensured their status as partnerships by
establishing that they lack continuity of life and limited liability.6 9
C. The LLC as an Attractive Alternative in Select
Business Situations
Business planners may view the LLC as an attractive alternative7o
to small, limited partnerships in some circumstances. The LLC particu-
larly suits potential partners that do not need the ability to freely
transfer all attributes of ownership. With such LLCs, transferability
restrictions on transfers of all attributes of ownership can be included
arise if an LLC had significantly more than twenty-five members and was managed by a member
with a small interest or by a manager that was not a member. Under this fact pattern, the
members could be viewed more as passive investors, much like limited partners in larger limited
partnerships. See supra notes 110, 165. Consequently, the right to freely transfer the economic
rights in the LLC could be substantively viewed as free transferability of interests. Therefore,
if the LLC has significantly more than twenty-five members and the absence of free transfera-
bility is essential to partnership status, Rev. Rul. 88-76 may not provide adequate assurance
of partnership status.
169. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. Congress illustrated its hostility toward
freely traded partnership interests by its statutory treatment of "publicly traded partnerships,"
(often referred to as master limited partnerships), as corporations, notwithstanding their lacking
two (usually continuity of life and limited liability) of the four corporate characteristics. See
I.R.C. § 7704 (West Supp. 1989). Partnerships are treated as publicly traded if the interests
are traded on an established securities market, or are readily tradeable on a secondary market
(or the substantial equivalent). Id. § 7704(b). See the Conference Committee Report on the
Revenue Act of 1987 for details on when the free transferability of partnership interests rises
to public trading. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100495, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 943-53, reprinted in
1987 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 2313-45, 2313-1689 to -1699. Certain publicly traded
partnerships are permitted to retain their status as partnerships if they otherwise lack two of
the four corporate characteristics. These are partnerships in which 90% or more of gross income
is "qualifying income." I.R.C. § 7704(c)(2) (West Supp. 1989). Qualifying income generally consists
of interest, dividends, rents on real property, gains from disposing of real property, income
from certain natural resource ventures, and gains from dealing in commodities, futures, options
or forward contracts where the partnership's principal activity is buying and selling those items.
Id. § 7704(d)(1). Given the obvious hostility toward publicly traded partnerships, counsel repre-
senting large partnerships, with interests that are freely transferable in substance but which
are not treated as publicly traded under § 7704, will not rely on the partnership technically
lacking free transferability of interests to ensure partnership status. Instead, they will insist
that the partnership lacks continuity of life and limited liability. Although it is no longer necessary
for the corporate general partner to have a minimum net worth, see Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7
I.R.B. 22, § 4.07, as a business matter, the corporate general partner is likely to have net
worth which could be viewed as substantial and is likely to contribute capital which could be
viewed as significant. Limited partners are simply more likely to invest if the general partner
is perceived as risking some of its own money.




and still result in meaningful consequences even when there are no
restrictions on transfering the economic rights of membership. Because
of these restrictions, the LLC will always substantively lack free trans-
ferability of interests and can therefore always be structured to avoid
corporate classification.171 Ventures that can benefit from such an ar-
rangement include high-risk real estate and natural resource ventures
that may be heavily leveraged with a limited number of participants.1-
Before the Service issued Revenue Ruling 88-76, the Subchapter S
Corporation was the only form that offered such ventures both limited
liability for all members and the flowthrough of taxable income and
losses to the owners, without a separate tax to the entity. - For these
business arrangements, the LLC offers the following: the certainty of
partnership status ' 74 without the problems associated with the general
partner seeking to mitigate its unlimited liability; flexibility in manag-
ing the business without jeopardizing any member's limited liability
status; 75 and the feature of limited liability for all members for state
law purposes without the limitations under Subchapter S.176
As noted previously, limited partnerships formed to conduct high-
risk ventures ordinarily will have a corporation serve as the general
partner in an attempt to minimize exposure to the risks of the busi-
ness.1n Sometimes the shareholders of the general partner are also
limited partners;178 other times the shareholders are unrelated to the
171. See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
172. See F. BURKE & A. BOWHAY, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION OF NATURAL RE-
SOURCES 9.24; Burke & Meyer, Federal Income Tax Classification of Natural Resource
Ventures: Co-Ownership, Partnership, or Association?, 37 Sw. L.J. 859, 860, 887-89 (1984);
Burke & Sessions, supra note 9, at 235; Seemann, supra note 53, at 536-37. Ownership interests
in these types of deals will usually not be readily tradeable. Consequently, the ability to freely
dispose of one's interest, as a business matter, is not as an important factor as in larger ventures.
See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text. Moreover, an ability to only dispose of the
economic interest without consent of all members will cause the entity to lack free transferability
of interests because in this context full membership has some meaning even if there is centralized
management. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text. The new member will probably
want to vote on the management.
173. See infra notes 211-44 and accompanying text which discusses S corporations. Because
of their restrictions, these deals normally were not conducted through S corporations.
174. See infra text accompanying notes 46-53, 112-14. Florida LLCs should either avoid
stating a right to continue in the articles while mitigating an unexpected dissolution through
contractual measures, or be structured so that centralized management does not exist. See supra
text accompanying notes 5-53, 71-75.
175. See infra notes 198-201 and accompanying text.
176. See infra text accompanying notes 211-44.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92.
178. See MCA v. United States, 685 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1982) (limited partners and general
partner can be affiliated and still have a valid limited partnership).
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limited partners. The Service will not rule that a limited partnership
lacks limited liability unless the partnership meets certain guidelines
with respect to the corporate general partner. 179 These guidelines elimi-
nate the prior requirement that the general partner have a minimum
net worth. 11 As noted above, however, the corporate general partner
still must prove that it is a genuine partner for tax purposes by
receiving at least one percent of every partnership item and by con-
tributing certain amounts of cash, property or substantial services to
the partnership.""l
At times, meeting these guidelines may be impossible or undesir-
able under the terms of the business agreement. While failure to meet
the guidelines does not preclude the entity from ultimately being
treated as a partnership, 1' the LLC offers more certainty of partner-
ship statusas and avoids concern as to how far one may deviate from
these guidelines.18
Regardless of how a limited partnership obtains classification as a
partnership for tax purposes, state law still requires that at least one
general partner have unlimited liability for all claims against the
partnership.as A corporate general partner will not always insulate
the shareholders from unlimited liability for the partnership's debts.
In certain situations, courts have held officers, directors, and share-
holders of a sole corporate general partner liable as general
partners on the grounds that the corporation was a mere shell through
which the limited partners exercised control over the partnership. 1
179. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22, § 4.01 to .04, 4.07.
180. The Service formerly required (as a condition to a partnership classification ruling)
that the sole corporate general partner have a net worth equal to at least 10% or 15% (depending
on the size of the partnership) of the total capital contributed to the partnership. See Rev. Proc.
72-13, 1972-1 C.B. 735, § 2.01. Limited partners could not own more than 20% of the general
partner's stock. Id. § 2.02.
181. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
182. These guidelines are for ruling purposes only. See Rev. Proc. 89-12, 1989-7 I.R.B. 22,
§ 1.03.
183. See supra notes 45-53, 111-14 and accompanying text.
184. Id.
185. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT, § 403 (1985).
186. See Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975) (corporation was a
mere fiction because its sole purpose was to manage and control limited partnership); cf.
Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 88 Wash. 2d 400, 562 P.2d 244 (Wash. 1977)
(because creditors relied on the corporate partner as the party with general liability, limited
partners who were also officers, directors, or shareholders were not personally liable). For a
further discussion of when officers, directors, and shareholders of a sole corporate general
partner have been held personally liable as general partners, see Feld, The Control Test For
Limited Partnerships, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1471 (1968); Note, Liability of a Limited Partner
Who is an Officer, Director and Shareholder of a Corporate Sole General Partner, 31 OKLA.
L. REV. 997 (1978).
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The danger of courts holding such persons personally liable for the
partnership's debts solely because they control the partnership through
the corporate general partner is somewhat diminished under the 1985
amendments of RULPA. 17 Those amendments only expose a limited
partner who controls the partnership to unlimited liability to the extent
that creditors mistakenly relied on that limited partner having the
status of a general partner.188 When such control is coupled with other
factors, however, a court could be more willing to disregard the cor-
porate entity under the common law doctrine of piercing the corporate
veil. 9
A court potentially can disregard any corporation if sufficient assets
do not exist to pay corporate liabilities. A complete discussion of all
details considered in the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is
beyond the scope of this article. Only the salient points relevant to
sole corporate general partners in limited partnerships will be dis-
cussed here. Commentators have noted the difficulty in predicting
when courts will pierce the corporate veil and hold shareholders liable
for creditors' claims. 190 Inadequate capitalization seems to be one of
the most important factors courts consider when deciding whether to
impose liability on shareholders for corporate obligations.191 Normally,
inadequate capitalization itself will not be enough to disregard the
corporation. 92 Other objective factors indicating misuse of the corpo-
rate form usually must exist, including mismanagement, comingling
of assets, explicit or implied financial misrepresentation, failure to
maintain records or corporate formalities, and direct intervention or
participation by the controlling shareholder in the management of the
corporation. 193 Finally, courts are more likely to pierce the corporate
veil when the creditor is an "involuntary creditor" such as a tort victim
or a contract claimant with little or no bargaining power, or when the
187. REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 303 (1985).
188. See id.
189. See infra text accompanying notes 190-97.
190. "Like lightning, it is rare, severe, and unprincipled." See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 158, at 106. See generally Hamilton, The Corporate Entity, 49 TEX. L. REV. 979 (1971);
Stone, The Place of Enterprise Liability in the Control of Corporate Conduct, 90 YALE L.J.
1 (1980).
191. See Hackney & Benson, supra note 157, at 859.
192. See id. at 859-60. The definition of what is adequate capital is very obscure. Courts
generally consider the corporation's business. See id. at 891-94. Presumably, corporate general
partners of limited partnerships engaging in risky businesses would be required to be more
generously capitalized.
193. Id. at 850-51.
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corporation is a subsidiary of another solvent corporation, than in
other situations.19
While all corporations risk the possibility that a court will disregard
the corporate entity, a sole corporate general partner with insufficient
capital is especially vulnerable, particularly when the corporate share-
holders really are managing the limited partnership. 195 Moreover, un-
like the traditional corporation, limited partnerships formed under
state law are supposed to provide creditors with at least one general
partner who has unlimited liability. 196 The arrangement looks particu-
larly abusive when the only partner with unlimited liability is a corpo-
ration with few assets, especially when the controlling shareholders
are running the partnership. 197 Consequently, participants should be
careful to ensure that the sole corporate general partner is adequately
capitalized. In other words, investors should place some amount of
capital other than the contributions to the partnership at risk in the
business.
One could view an LLC as a more attractive alternative' 98 because
for state law purposes no member has personal liability for the com-
pany's debts, yet the LLC still has all the advantages of partnerships
for tax purposes.199 The LLC allows members more flexibility in struc-
turing the unlimited liability features than exists with the smaller
limited partnerships. If certain creditors insisted on unlimited liability
to secure their claims, designated members could assume or guarantee
those debts.200 This preserves the unlimited liability feature for all
members as to all other claims. Under the LLC form, there would
be no need to have any member exposed to unlimited liability for
unexpected claims such as damages in tort actions. 20'
194. See Berle, supra note 82, at 350; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 158, at 99-100;
Hackney & Benson, supra note 157, at 864-69.
195. See Hackney & Benson, supra note 157, at 864 n.122 (citing In re First Nat'l Bank,
23 F. Supp. 255 (E.D. Ill. 1938) (court disregarded corporation with inadequate capital when
the sole shareholder dominated the affairs of the business)).
196. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 101(7), 403 (1985).
197. However, this concern is present regardless of whether or not the controlling sharehold-
ers who are running the partnership are also limited partners. The case for piercing the corporate
veil seemingly is stronger if they are limited partners.
198. An LLC is likely over time to be subject to some form of the doctrine of piercing the
corporate veil. Unlike the limited partnership, however, the LLC is not structured so that
creditors can expect any member to have unlimited liability. Consequently, the abuses concerning
limited partnerships are not present with LLCs. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95.
199. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
200. For a discussion of the effect this would have on the operating provisions of Subchapter
K, see infra text accompanying notes 287-333.
201. But see supra text accompanying note 150.
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Moreover, the LLC form offers more flexibility to the members
in managing the business than the smaller limited partnership. With
a limited partnership, the power to control the partnership's business
is vested in the general partner.m Regardless of whether an LLC or
limited partnership is chosen, the participants often desire a central
manager and at the same time, flexibility to participate in certain
aspects of the business. As noted, LLCs are free either to allow
members full and equal management rights or to vest management in
a select group.0 Either way, each member's limited liability is unaf-
fected.20, Limited partners, however, have to distance themselves from
the partnership's business affairs, or courts will not respect their li-
mited liability status.
215
LLCs also provide a useful mechanism for Subchapter S Corpora-
tions to segregate different aspects or branches of its business for
limited liability purposes while still maintaining control.2 - S corpora-
tions are not permitted to be members of an affiliated group.2°7 Con-
sequently, an S corporation that owns a number of separate divisions
or operates its business at a number of different locations cannot
segregate each division in a wholly-owned subsidiary.208 An LLC, how-
ever, is not a corporation. 2°9 Therefore, an S corporation could segre-
gate each division or location in a different LLC, owning almost all
of the interests21° in each while avoiding membership in an affiliated
group.
In situations where the LLC offers a viable choice over a partner-
ship, it offers even clearer advantages over an S corporation. Congress
designed Subchapter S to create an entity that serves as a tax conduit
202. See REVISED UNIF. LTD. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 403 (1985).
203. See supra text accompanying notes 71-75.
204. Id. Moreover, there is nothing in the Florida or Wyoming acts that would expose a
member not designated as a manager to unlimited liability for participating in the business.
FLA. STAT. § 608.436 (1987); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (1977).
205. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
206. But see supra text accompanying notes 190-97 (discussing the possibility of piercing
the corporate veil).
207. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(2)(A) (1986). An affiliated group is defined as a chain of corpora-
tions where the common parent owns at least 80% of the vote and value of the stock of at least
one subsidiary. See id. § 1504(a). In other words, an S corporation cannot own 80% or more of
another corporation's stock.
208. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
209. See Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360.
210. See id. Because LLCs require two or more members, the S corporation will have to
find another person, presumably one of its officers or shareholders, to serve as a nominal member
of the LLC.
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for small businesses, similar to a partnership, while allowing the own-
ers to enjoy the corporate characteristic of limited liability.211 A pur-
ported purpose behind the Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982 was to
more closely align the treatment of S corporations and partnerships.
221
Numerous commentators have discussed the differences between S
corporations and partnerships, concluding that in most instances the
partnership is the superior form.213 An examination of every significant
difference between the S corporation and partnership forms is beyond
the scope of this article.214 This section focuses on the differences
between Subchapter K and Subchapter S that are most important to
transactions in which an LLC may prove to be a superior alternative
over the small limited partnership: high-risk, leveraged real estate or
natural resource ventures.
In some respects the rules of Subchapter S and Subchapter K are
very similar. Under both, undistributed income as well as losses flow
through from the entity, retaining the character, and are reported by
the owners. 21 5 The Code only permits the owners to deduct losses
flowing through to the extent of their basis in the entity.2 6 The owners
do not pay tax again when receiving distributions attributable to tax-
able income that flowed through from the entity. Such income origi-
nally increased their basis; the distribution will then cause a decrease
in basis.
2 17
Eligibility restrictions that burden S corporations do not apply to
LLCs governed by Subchapter K. An S corporation can have no more
211. See Kaplan & Ritter, Partnerships and S Corporations: Has the Tax Gap Been
Bridged?, 1 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX'N 3 n.1 (1984). But see supra text accompanying notes 190-97.
212. See Eustice, Subchapter S Corporations and Partnerships: A Search for the Pass
Through Paradigm (Some Preliminary Proposals), 39 TAx L. REv. 345, 346 (1984).
213. See August & Silow, S Corporation vs. Partnership for Real Estate Ventures, 1 J.
TAX'N INVESTMENTS 91 (1983); Kaplan & Ritter, supra note 211; Liveson, Partnership vs. S
Corporations: A Comparative Analysis in Light of Legislative Developments, 5 J. PARTNERSHIP
TAX'N 142 (1989); Massoglia & Choate, Using an S Corporation for Oil and Gas Operations:
More Flexible but Still Restrictive, 59 J. TAX'N 102 (1983); Mullaney & Blau, An Analytic
Comparison of Partnerships and S Corporations as Vehicles for Leveraged Investments, 59 J.
TAx'N 142 (1983).
214. For a particularly exhaustive analysis as well as an extensive policy discussion with
suggestions for change, see Eustice, supra note 212.
215. See I.R.C. § 702 (1986); I.R.C. § 1366 (West Supp. 1989).
216. See I.R.C. § 704(d) (1986); I.R.C. §1366(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989). But see infra note
250 which describes other limitations on the deductibility of losses flowing through from a
pass-through entity.
217. See I.R.C. §§ 705, 1367 (1986).
[Vol. 41
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
than thirty five shareholders. 211 Moreover, only United States citizens,
resident aliens, and certain trusts can be shareholders.219 In contrast,
virtually all types of persons, including partnerships and corporations,
are eligible for LLC membership.2 0 Corporations must make an affir-
mative election, with the consent of all shareholders, to secure Sub-
chapter S status.22' The rules of Subchapter K automatically apply if
the LLC lacks two of the four corporate characteristics.'
The Code only allows S corporations to have one class of stock.
2
2
This limitation effectively prohibits shareholders of S corporations from
making special allocations of the corporation's income and losses, a
privilege highly regarded by partnerships and now LLCs.2- The single
class of stock requirement can cause concern when the S corporation
issues debt and other instruments such as warrants and options to
outsiders. If the Service treats these outsiders as shareholders, the
Subchapter S election may terminate.2
Probably the most important advantage of Subchapter K over Sub-
chapter S is Subchapter K's treatment of the entity's liabilities for
basis purposes.-2 6 Under the rules of Subchapter K, an LLC member's
basis in its interest will increase for its share of the LLC's liabilities.m
218. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(a) (West Supp. 1989).
219. See id. § 1361(b)(1). Restrictive buy/sell agreements are necessary to make sure the
Subchapter S election is not terminated by the sale of the stock to an ineligible shareholder.
220. See supra note 134 and accompanying text.
221. See I.R.C. § 1362 (1986). Commentators have different opinions concerning the desira-
bility of the election requirement for S corporations. Compare Eustice, supra note 212, at 368
(affirmative election presents opportunity for taxpayer blunders) with August & Silow, supra
note 213, at 116 (election procedure provides more certainty that entity will get conduit treat-
ment). For details concerning the Subchapter S election, see I.R.C. § 1362 (West Supp. 1989);
Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.1362-1 to -2, reprinted in 8 FED. TAXEs (P-H) 33,366 to -66-E.
222. An LLC presumably would become taxable under the partnership rules as soon as it
filed its articles with the Secretary of State.
223. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (West Supp. 1989).
224. See August & Sflow, supra note 213, at 110; Eustice, supra note 212, at 395; Kaplan
& Ritter, supra note 211, at 16; Liveson, supra note 213, at 149.
225. See I.R.C. § 1362(d)(2)(A) (West Supp. 1989). Although the straight debt safe harbor,
see id. § 1361(c)(5), provides some certainty that certain debt will not be treated as stock, this
concern still arises if the safe harbor cannot be met. For example, the corporation may issue
the debt to a creditor that could not be a shareholder in an S corporation. See Eustice & Kuntz,
Federal Incore Taxation of S Corporations 3.07[3](b) (1985). Although warrants and options
are generally not treated as stock for Subchapter S purposes, arguably, they could be treated
as stock if sufficient certainty of exercise exists. See Bravenec, Federal Taxation of S Corpora-
tions and Shareholders T 7.3.4.5 (1988).
226. See August & Slow, supra note 213, at 119; Eustice, supra note 212, at 397; Kaplan
& Ritter, supra note 211, at 15; Liveson, supra note 213, at 145-46.
227. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1986). For a detailed discussion of how debt is allocated for basis
purposes, see infra text accompanying notes 257-71, 288-305.
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Shareholders of S corporations receive no comparable basis increase
for the corporation's debts unless the shareholder is the lender.22
Consequently, LLC members have an opportunity to deduct losses
attributable to borrowed funds.- For years, this feature alone caused
many venturers to operate as a partnership rather than an S corpora-
tion.230
Subchapter K provides a mechanism, unavailable in Subchapter S,
for adjusting the basis of partnership assets if a partnership interest
is sold, exchanged, or passed by inheritance.ml If a section 754 elec-
tion22 is in effect, a transferee partner acquiring an interest in a
partnership with appreciated assets will receive a positive basis adjust-
ment in the partnership's assets equal to the amount paid for the
partnership interest minus the transferor partner's share of the
partnership's asset basis.m This election usually prevents an incoming
partner from later having to recognize taxable gain due to appreciation
that occurred before it became a partner.2 This feature can be very
important in preserving the value of a partnership interest where the
assets are expected to appreciate or at least decline in value more
slowly than the depreciation rate for tax purposes.2
Subchapter K contains another mechanism, not present in Subchap-
ter S which ensures that built-in gain or loss in contributed property
is allocated back to the contributing partner.3 Section 704(c) of the
Code requires that allocations of the partnership's items of income,
gain, loss, and deduction attributable to contributed property take
into account the variation between the partnership's basis in the prop-
erty and its fair market value at the time of contribution.2 The con-
cepts embodied in section 704(c) can best be illustrated by a simple
228. See I.R.C. § 1367(b)(2) (1986).
229. See infra text accompanying notes 257-87.
230. See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
231. See I.R.C. § 743(b) (1986).
232. Adjustments to the basis of assets inside the partnership will also result if a distribution
to a partner results in recognized gain or loss or the partner receives a higher or lower basis
in the asset that the partnership had. See id. § 734(b).
233. See id. § 743(b). If the assets inside the partnership have declined in value, the
partner's share of the partnership's inside basis will decrease by the transferor's share of the
partnership's inside basis minus the amount paid for the partnership interest; see also id. § 755
(code section and regulations promulgated thereunder explain how to apportion the basis increase
or decrease among the partnership's assets).
234. Id. § 743(b).
235. See Liveson, supra note 213, at 151.




example: Assume that one person contributes cash of $100 and the
other contributes an asset worth $100 with a $50 basis, and each owns
one half of the entity. If later the asset was sold for $100, an S
corporation would have to allocate $25 of gain to each person.2 8 This
allocation would force the cash contributor to recognize gain from
appreciation that accrued before the venture was formed. Section
704(c) requires a partnership to allocate all $50 of the gain to the
partner who contributed the property.23 Unlike the allocation provi-
sions in Subchapter S, section 704(c) ensure that distortions24 like this
do not occur in partnerships.
Finally, in the context of high-risk real estate or natural resource
ventures, certain participants may only want to contribute services
in exchange for a larger share of the profits later, when the deal
becomes profitable. As already noted, Subchapter K will allow an LLC
to make special allocations reflecting this business arrangement as
long as the allocations have substantial economic effect.-, All items
of the S corporation's income, gains, losses, and deductions, however,
must be allocated pro rata, based on stock ownership, to each share-
holder at the end of the S corporation's taxable year.m In other words,
the S corporation cannot allocate a larger share of the profits to one
shareholder at a specified time if such allocation does not represent
that shareholder's pro rata share of the profits. Moreover, with an S
corporation, shareholders may not contribute services for stock with-
out recognizing immediate gain.24 The rules of Subchapter K, however,
permit LLC members to contribute services for an interest in profits
without recognizing income until the entity actually earns profits.2"
V. THE EFFECT OF THE LLC FORM ON THE OPERATING
RULES OF SUBCHAPTER K
As noted above, LLCs can be structured to qualify as partnerships
for federal income tax purposes.3" With partnerships, state law re-
238. I.R.C. § 1366 (West Supp. 1989).
239. I.R.C. § 704(c) (1986).
240. But see Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(c)(2) (as amended in 1987) (limiting the total amount of
gain or loss that can be allocated to any partner equal to the amount of gain or loss realized
by the partnership). To the extent this "ceiling rule" applies, § 704(c) will not cure the distortions.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 138-40; infra text accompanying notes 306-20.
242. See I.R.C. § 1366 (West Supp. 1989).
243. See I.R.C. § 351(d) (West Supp. 1989) (applying to corporations generally).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 135-40.
245. But see supra text accompanying notes 50-53 (discussing the right to continue business
option available to Florida LLCs).
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quires that at least one partner have unlimited liability for all claims
against the partnership. 246 With LLCs, however, no member has un-
limited liability for any of the LLC's debt, unless a member specifically
agrees to assume or guarantee specific debts.- 7 In this respect, an
LLC resembles a limited partnership that has no general partner. The
absolute limited liability granted to all members of an LLC directly
affects certain rules in Subchapter K - specifically, the provisions
allowing members to share the LLC's debt for purposes of increasing
the basis of each member's2As interest in the entity and the rules
governing how the LLC's losses and deductions can be allocated to
the members.
The adjusted basis of a partner's interest in a partnership, also
referred to as the partner's "outside basis," is important for a number
of reasons.2 9 As noted, a partner may only deduct allocations of the
partnership's losses and deductions against other income to the extent
that such partner has enough outside basis at the end of the partner-
ship's taxable year to absorb the loss flowing out.2 If the partner's
246. See supra text accompanying notes 85-88.
247. An "assumption" occurs when someone agrees to replace the original borrower and
consequently has no rights to proceed against the original borrower. See BLACK'S LAW DIcTIoN-
ARY 157 (4th ed. 1968). In contrast, guarantors "step into the shoes" of the creditor and inherit
the creditor's rights to proceed against the borrower. See id. at 833. See also infra note 287
and accompanying text.
248. For purposes of this article, unless the context requires otherwise, the discussion of
the rules of Subchapter K, as applied to both partnerships and LLCs, refers to the entity as
a '"partnership" and its owners as "partners." When this article focuses primarily on LLCs, the
entity will be referred to as an "LLC" and its owners will be referred to as '"members." A
member's or partner's basis in the LLC or partnership is sometimes referred to as "outside basis."
249. If a partner sells his or her interest, the gain or loss equals the amount realized over
the partner's adjusted basis at the time of the sale. See I.R.C. § 741 (1986). Such gain or loss
will be capital unless the sale is attributable to certain unrealized receivables and inventory
items inside the partnership. See id. §§ 751(a), (c)-(d). Distributions of money are only tax-free
to the extent the partner has outside basis to cover the distribution. See id. §§ 731, 733.
250. Sie I.R.C. § 704(d) (1986). At the end of the partnership's taxable year, each partner's
outside basis is first increased by allocations of partnership taxable income and partnership
tax-exempt income. See id. § 705(a)(1). Then outside basis is decreased, first by distributions
to the partner and finally by allocations of partnership losses and deductions. In no event is
outside basis ever reduced below zero. See id. § 705(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 66-94, 1966-1 C.B. 166.
See also Treas. Reg. § 1.731-1(a)(1)(ii) (1966) (ordinary distributions take place on the last day
of partnership's taxable year, regardless of when the distribution actually took place).
If the partner is an individual or a closely held C corporation, it can only deduct the losses
flowing through from the partnership to the extent of its economic exposure or "at-risk" amount
in the venture. See I.R.C. § 465(a)(1) (West Supp. 1989); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a)(2).
Generally, a partner is treated as being at-risk to the extent of the money and the adjusted
basis of property it contributed to the partnership. I.R.C. § 465(b) (West Supp. 1989). A partner
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outside basis is insufficient to cover the loss, such loss will be sus-
pended until the partner has enough outside basis to absorb it.21
A partner's outside basis increases by the amount of money and
the adjusted basis of property it contributes to the partnership. 2 A
partner's outside basis will also increase by its sharem of partnership
liabilities because the Code treats such share as a constructive contri-
bution of money by the partner to the partnership.2 Partnership
is also at-risk for its share of the partnership recourse liabilities from an unrelated party. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.465-24(a)(2). Nonrecourse debt at the partnership level will not produce usable
deductions unless the amounts borrowed are considered "qualified nonrecourse financing," within
the meaning of § 465(b)(6). See I.R.C. § 465(b)(6) (West Supp. 1989); Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.465-25. If the borrowed amounts are treated as "qualified nonrecourse financing" which gen-
erally means the loan is from a bona fide lending institution for the purpose of holding real
property, see I.R.C. § 465(b)(6)(B) (West Supp. 1989), then the partners are deemed to be
at-risk. Id. § 465(b)(6)(A). The at-risk amount would then be apportioned among the members
based on the profit sharing ratio. See I.R.G. § 465(b)(6)(C). The at-risk amount determined by
the temporary regulations under § 752 are not intended to provide any correlation for determining
at-risk for purposes of § 465.
Section 469 states other limitations on the extent a partner can deduct losses that have
flowed through from the partnership. See id. § 469. Generally, unless the partner materially
participates in the partnership's activity, see id. § 469(c)(1)(B), section 469 will deny the deduction
of these "passive losses" unless the partner has passive income from other sources. It is generally
presumed that limited partners do not materially participate in the partnership's activities. See
id. § 469(h)(2).
2.51. See I.R.C. § 704(d) (1986). If the losses are of different characters and the partner
only has enough losses to cover part of them, the regulations require the losses to flow out pro
rata. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(d)(2) (as amended in 1987).
252. See I.R.C. § 722 (1986). If a partner purchases the partnership interest from another
partner, the partner's initial outside basis will be the amount of cash and the fair market value
of any property tendered to the selling partner plus the partner's share of the partnership's
liabilities. See id. 99 742, 752(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.742-1 (1960).
2,53. Increasing outside basis for a share of partnership liabilities reflects the theory of
treating partnerships like an aggregate group of partners rather than an entity. Because bor-
rowed funds are not generally taxed, as the Service assumes those amounts will be paid back,
the Service allows this increase so the partnership could distribute those funds without having
the partners recognize income from the distribution.
254. See I.R.C. § 752(a) (1986); Temp. Treas. Reg. 1.752-1T(a), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,143
(1988). The Service treats any decrease in a partner's share of the partnership's liabilities as a
constructive distribution of money and will therefore decrease outside basis. See I.R.C. § 752(b)
(1989); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(c), 53 Fed. Reg. 53140, 53145 (1988). These decreases
occur, for example, when the partnership sells or distributes property subject to a partnership
liability or when the partnership makes principal payments on its liabilities. If the partnership
assumes a partner's individual liability, the Service treats this assumption as a constructive
distribution of money and producing a corresponding decrease to the partner's outside basis for
the entire amount assumed. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(f(2)(i), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140,
53,150 (1988).
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liabilities2 are crucial to any venture in which the partners expect
to receive allocations of partnership losses and deductions in excess
of other amounts of money and the adjusted basis of property they
have contributed.
Computation of each partner's share depends on whether the
partnership liability is recourse or nonrecourse.2 7 Under the tempo-
rary regulations promulgated under section 752,2 the Service will
consider a partnership's liability recourse to the extent that any part-
ner bears the risk of loss if the partnership is unable to pay the
liability.2
9
The partnership provisions in Subchapter K will apply to LLCs
and their members. 260 Consequently, members of LLCs will compute
their outside bases using the same rules to which partners are subject.
Likewise, LLC members will be subject to the same limitations on
the deductibility of losses flowing through from the LLC.
261
Unlike the traditional general or limited partnership, state law
dictates that no member of an LLC has unlimited liability for the
LLC's debts. 26 2 Consequently, unless a particular member assumes or
guarantees the LLC's debt26 or the LLC borrows the funds from a
member or a person related to the member, 26 LLC liabilities are
always nonrecourse.- In such cases, the members of an LLC automat-
255. An obligation is treated as a partnership liability only to the extent such liability gives
rise to the creation or increase of the basis of any property held by the partnership; a deduction
for the partnership; or an expenditure not deductible in computing the partnership's taxable
income or properly chargeable to capital. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(g), 53 Fed. Reg.
53,140, 53,150 (1988). See also Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-IT(k) ex.2, 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140,
53,152 (1988) (example of an obligation that is not treated as a partnership liability).
256. But see supra note 250 (discussing other limitations on the use of the partnership's
losses).
257. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,143 (1988).
258. Congress mandated the Treasury to revise the regulations under § 752 in the Tax
Reform Act of 1984. See GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE
DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, H.R. DOC. No. 4170, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 250-52 (1984)
(discussing history behind these temporary regulations).
259. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,143 (1988)
260. See Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a)(1), (3) (as amended in 1983) (unincorporated organi-
zation will be classified as a partnership if it lacks at least two of the four corporate characteris-
tics); see also supra note 222.
261. Id.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
263. See supra note 247; infra text accompanying note 287.
264. See infra text accompanying notes 290, 328-33.
265. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(B)(4)(ii)(B), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140 53,146
(1988) (if entity is treated as a partnership for tax purposes, but none of its members have un-
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ically share the LLC's liabilities for purposes of increasing their outside
basis under the more favorable rules for nonrecourse debt. Also, the
LLC may allocate the losses arising from the nonrecourse debt to its
members under the safe harbor rule for allocating nonrecourse deduc-
tions, which does not require members to meet the substantial
economic effect standard. 2r
If the partnership's debt is nonrecourse,2 7 then the partners share
the liability for purposes of increasing their outside bases based on
three factors which are applied consecutively. Partnership nonrecourse
debt is first allocated to those partners according to their share of
the partnership's "minimum gain' '2r if any; any remaining nonrecourse
debt is then allocated to those partners according to certain required
income allocations under section 704(c) and section 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) of
the regulations.269 Finally, any remaining nonrecourse debt is allocated
to all partners according to how they have agreed to share gains and
profits. 270 The profit-sharing ratio ultimately controls even though cre-
limited liability, then all liabilities are treated as if creditors' rights are limited
to the assets of the partnership, i.e., nonrecourse liabilities). If any member had an unpaid
capital contribution obligation, similar to a limited partner's, the LLC's liabilities should be
recourse to that extent with that member bearing the risk of loss.
266. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-IT(b), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161 (1988) and infra text
accompanying notes 267-86.
267. The Service considers liability of a partnership nonrecourse if no partner bears the
risk of loss. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(e)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,150 (1988).
268. For a discussion of the concept of minimum gain and its relevance, see infra text
accompanying notes 277-82.
269. See supra text accompanying notes 236-40. The Service requires income allocations
under § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) of the regulations when a new partner being admitted contributes cash
to the partnership and the other partners "book up" their capital accounts to reflect the appreci-
ation in the partnership's assets. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)(h), 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) (as
amended in 1987). Gain representing appreciation that occurred before the new partner was
admitted from the sale of these assets must be allocated back to the partners that booked up
their capital accounts. Id. See infra note 309 (explaining a partner's capital account).
Nonrecourse liabilities will be added first to the partners' outside bases in proportion to how
they would recognize "minimum gain," and then according to how they would recognize § 704(c)
gain, and gain under § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) of the regulations, if the partnership hypothetically disposed
of all property subject to nonrecourse liabilities for no consideration other than the relief of
these liabilities. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752 1T(e)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,150 (1988).
270. The Service's allocation of nonrecourse liabilities among partners, first, according to
the minimum gain and, then, according to required gain allocations under I.R.C. § 704(c) (1986)
and Treas Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(4)(i) (as amended in 1987), is an attempt to coordinate the increases
to outside bases under § 752 with the treatment of nonrecourse liabilities under § 704(b). See
53 Fed. Reg. 53, 140 (1988) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 1,602). Previously, the Service
allocated nonrecourse debt for outside basis purposes by the profit sharing ratio only. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (as amended in 1960). The partnership can state each partner's interest in
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ditors cannot force any partner to actually pay the debt. Outside basis
increases for nonrecourse liabilities are not based on how the partners
bear risk of loss.271
Having nonrecourse debt at the partnership level is very advan-
tageous from a tax standpoint, particularly if the organization's mem-
bership consists of limited partners or LLC members with little or
no unpaid capital contribution obligations. If the partnership's debt is
nonrecourse, all partners are eligible to receive increases to their
outside bases even though they bear no risk of loss. The partnership
can therefore allocate deductible 27 losses under the favorable rules for
allocating nonrecourse deductions or make cash distributions to such
partners without requiring them to agree to make actual payments
or contributions to pay the liability back.
Generally, partners can agree to allocate partnership items of in-
come, gain, loss, deduction, or credit for tax purposes any way they
see fit as long as the allocations have substantial economic effect.273
Losses and deductions arising from nonrecourse debt24 cannot have
economic effect because no partner bears the risk of loss. The creditor
alone bears the risk that the property securing the debt will decline
in value below the principal amount of the loan.7 If the partnership
partnership profits in the agreement and have it respected if it corresponds to a significant
allocation of partnership income or gain which has substantial economic effect. See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.752 1T(e)(3)(ii)(C), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,150 (1988).
271. Id. The theory behind using the profit sharing ratio is that the partnership has to
earn a profit either from operations or use proceeds from the sale of assets to pay the debt. If
the partnership loses money and the partnership's assets decline in value, the lender bears the
loss. If the partnership earns profits, the lender can insist that the loan be paid out of such
profits and the partners will pay tax on those profits even if there are no cash distributions.
See also I.R.C. § 752(c) (1986) (providing that a nonrecourse liability can increase the partners'
outside bases only to the extent of the underlying property's fair market value).
272. See supra note 250 (discussing other limitations on the deductibility of the losses).
Although the regulations dealing with the application of the at-risk limitations and the passive
loss limitations only refer to partnerships, the same concepts would presumably apply to losses
flowing from LLCs. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.465-6(b), -7(a), reprinted in 5 FED. TAXES
(P-H) 20,648.36, .37 (1979); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2T(e), 53 Fed. Reg. 5686, 5718 (1988).
273. See infra notes 288-320 and accompanying text.
274. Generally, the regulations treat losses or deductions as nonrecourse deductions to the
extent that such losses or deductions reduce the basis of the property securing the nonrecourse
debt below the principal amount of the nonrecourse note. Such increase in nonrecourse deductions
is known as the net increase in partnership minimum gain during the taxable year. See Temp.
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(b), (c), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161 (1988).
275. For purposes of testing loss allocations attributable to recourse or nonrecourse debt
the regulations assume that the property's fair market value equals the property's adjusted
basis. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iii)(c)(2) (as amended in 1987). Thus, once the property's
adjusted basis is reduced below the principal amount of the note (by depreciation, for example) the
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meets the requirements in the regulations, the regulations view allo-
cations of nonrecourse deductions to be in accord with the partner's
interest in the partnership even though no economic effect is present.276
For nonrecourse deductions to come within the safe harbor, the
partnership agreement, among other requirements,m must have a
"minimum gain chargeback. ' 7 A minimum gain chargeback requires
the partnership to allocate income to the partner claiming the non-
recourse deductions to the extent such partner's minimum gain (rep-
resented generally by allocations of losses, deductions, or distributions
of loan proceeds attributable to nonrecourse debt) is decreased on a
net basis.0 s
For example, minimum gain will decrease, thus forcing an income
allocation, if the partnership pays principal on the nonrecourse loan
or if the property securing the nonrecourse loan is sold, abandoned,
foreclosed, or otherwise disposed of.280 If the partnership abandoned
the property, for example, even if it was worthless, the partnership
would have an amount realized equal to the debt relief, causing "phan-
tom gain" to the extent the debt exceeded the property's basis.2l
Under the nonrecourse debt allocation rules, the partnership would
have to allocate, that phantom gain to the partners in proportion to
how they claimed the nonrecourse deductions or received distributions
of proceeds from nonrecourse debt. These required income alloca-
tions for net decreases of minimum gain often produce income alloca-
tions without cash flow. Unlike the deficit restoration obligations,
which are required under the economic effect test in allocations of
losses attributable to recourse debt,2 minimum gain chargebacks
never force partners to actually contribute cash. Obviously, partners
would rather have the partnership allocate them taxable income even
without corresponding cash flow, than be forced to contribute cash.
regulations assume that the .property's sale will not produce enough cash to pay off the loan.
That "spread," or the difference between the property's adjusted basis and the principal of the
nonrecourse note, is a nonrecourse deduction. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(c), 53
Fed. Reg. 53,161 (1988).
276. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(a), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,616 (1988).
277. The partnership agreement must maintain capital accounts and follow positive capital
accounts at liquidation. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(d)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161 (1988).
278. Id. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(e), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161, 53,163 (1988).
279. Id. §§ 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(e), (f), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161, 53,163 (1988).
280. See id.
281. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300 (1983) (citing Crane v. Commissioner, 331
U.S. 1 (1947)).
282. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(e)-(f), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161, 53,163 (1988).
283. See infra notes 311-18 and accompanying text.
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The nonrecourse debt allocation rules also require the partnership
agreement to allocate the losses and deductions attributable to non-
recourse deductions in a manner reasonably consistent with some other
allocation that has substantial economic effect.2 Generally, the
partners can allocate these losses and deductions according to how
they share economic losses, how they share economic profits, or any
median between these two figures, and still satisfy the requirement.2
This requirement of "reasonable consistency" provides more flexibility
for allocating nonrecourse deductions. The economic effect test, re-
quired for all allocations of deductions attributable to recourse debt,
basically requires the partnership to allocate the losses according to
how the partners technically bear the risk of loss.
2
Often, as a business matter, the creditor will not make a loan to
the LLC if no member has personal liability. In these cases, a desig-
nated member can contractually assume or guarantee the loan. An
assumption or guarantee of a nonrecourse liability effectively changes
it to a recourse liability to the extent that a member assumes or
guarantees it.28 Consequently, if a member assumes or guarantees an
obligation of the LLC, the rules for recourse liabilities govern the
increases in outside bases and the allocation of losses for tax purposes.
Partners share partnership recourse liabilities for purposes of in-
creasing their outside bases according to how each individually bears
the risk of loss, taking into account all arrangements between the
partners, the partnership, and persons related to the partners. ' 8 The
284. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(d)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161, 53,163 (1988).
285. Id. In order to use the loss sharing ratio to support the "reasonably consistent" require-
ment, the partner whose allocation of nonrecourse deductions is being supported by its loss sharing
ratio must have made material capital contributions to the partnership as compared with the
amount of nonrecourse debt financing. Id. For example, if the partnership is 100% leveraged
with nonrecourse debt, then the loss sharing ratio can not be used to allocate nonrecourse
deductions. Generally, if the nonrecourse debt does not exceed 90% of the property's financing
(that is, the partners contribute or are personally liable for 10% of the property's value) then
the regulations will deem the capital contributions to be material and the partners can divide
the nonrecourse deductions based on the loss sharing ratio. See id. § 1.704-1T(b)(5) ex. 20.
286. See infra notes 306-18 and accompanying text.
287. Assumptions of nonrecourse liabilities produce personal liability for the assuming
member (with a corresponding increase to outside basis) because, like assumptions of recourse
liabilities, the assuming member agrees to discharge the LLC's indebtedness as it comes due.
Guarantees of nonrecourse loans also cause the guarantor or member to have personal liability.
Although the guarantor inherits the creditor's rights to proceed against the LLC, with guaran-
teed nonrecourse debt of an LLC, no rights exist against any member personally for the
guarantor to inherit. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A), (d)(3)(iv), (f), 53 Fed. Reg.
53,140, 53,148 (1988); see also Abramson v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 360 (1986); Smith v. Commis-
sioner, 84 T.C. 889 (1985).
288. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(a)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,143 (1988).
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regulations provide two ways for a partner to be treated as bearing
the economic risk of loss with respect to partnership recourse
liabilities. A partner's outside basis will be increased to the extent
that either:2 (1) the partner or persons related to such partner2° are
obligated to make a net payment to a creditor or another person ("Net
Payment Obligations");291 or (2) such partner is obligated to make a
net contribution to the partnership ("Net Contribution Obligations")
92
if the partnership "constructively liquidated. ' ' 3 Constructive liquida-
tion generally means the partnership is unable to pay the liability
because all of its assets are deemed to have become worthless.
The Net Payment Obligation generally is designed to increase the
outside basis of those partners who have either directly agreed or had
a related person agree to assume or guarantee certain partnership
debts. Any reimbursements to which the partner or the related
person is entitled will offset the partner's increase in outside basis.2
5
The Net Contribution Obligation looks to the relative amount each
partner would have to contribute to the partnership. This evaluation
takes into account the manner in which all the partners have agreed
289. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(1), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,146 (1988)
(partner -mill be treated as having a Net Contribution Obligation only to the extent the obligation
is not treated as a Net Payment Obligation); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-IT(d), 53 Fed. Reg.
53,140, 53,145 (1988).
290. Persons related to a partner is defined in Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-IT(h), 53 Fed.
Reg. 53,140, 53,151 (1988), to include, generally, certain members of a partner's family and
corporations that are in the same affiliated group as the partner. This section prevents partners
from deflecting outside basis increases to other partners by having a related person obligated
to make the payment.
291. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,145 (1988).
292. Id. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,146 (1988).
293. See id. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(iii), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,146 (1988). The concept of construc-
tive liquidation is a mechanism to test who would bear the risk of loss if the absolute worst
events occurred economically. A partnership is deemed to constructively liquidate if: (1) all the
partnership's assets became worthless; (2) all the liabilities became due and payable; (3) the
partnership disposed of all partnership property for no consideration other than the relief of
the liabilities; and (4) all items of income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit are allocated on the
date of liquidation in accordance with the partnership agreement.
294. See id. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(2)(i)B), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,146 (1988). Increasing
the partner's outside basis for guarantees and assumptions made by related partners prevents
a partner from arbitrarily shifting outside basis over to another partner by having a related
person make the agreement. If a person related to a partner agrees to make a contribution to
the partnership with respect to a liability, the regulations treat the agreement as a Net Payment
Obligation of the partner's. Id.
295. Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(1)(ii), (d)(3)(ii)(C), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140,
53,145 (1988).
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to bear losses, as well as additional amounts any individual partner
agreed to contribute, and any rights to reimbursement which result
from such contributions.2
So, for example, when a general partnership incurs recourse debt,
absent other side agreements, the partners will share the debt, for
purposes of increasing their outside bases, in the manner they have
agreed to bear losses. 97 If one partner assumes the whole obligation,
that partner's outside basis increases by the entire liability. By assum-
ing the entire obligation, that partner would be forced to pay the
entire amount as a Net Payment Obligation and such partner could
not seek reimbursement from the other partners based on the loss
sharing ratio.m With a general partnership incurring recourse debt,
however, if one partner merely guarantees the partnership's liability,
all still share the liability, for purposes of increasing the partners'
outside bases, according to the loss sharing ratio. 29 If creditors forced
the guarantor partner to pay the entire liability, such partner could
proceed against the other partners according to the loss sharing ratio
because the guarantor's rights are subrogated to all rights that the
original creditor had.30°
If a limited partnership incurs recourse debt, the limited partners
will never have a Net Contribution Obligation with respect to partner-
ship recourse liabilities in excess of their individual unpaid capital
contribution obligations. A limited partner's unpaid capital contribution
obligation represents the amount the limited partner promised to con-
tribute to the partnership's capital, but has not yet contributed.301
Under state law a limited partner can only be forced to contribute its
unpaid capital contribution obligation to the partnership. 30 2 Con-
296. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,146 (1988).
297. Id. If the partnership constructively liquidated and all assets were deemed to become
worthless, each partner would have an obligation to contribute a pro rata share to pay the debt
equal to the loss sharing ratio. Even if the creditor forced one partner to pay the entire debt,
that partner could proceed against the others based on the loss sharing ratio. See id.
298. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,145 (1988).
Because the assuming partner has agreed to replace the original debtor, i.e., the partnership,
the partner inherits no additional rights to proceed against the other parties from the creditor.
See supra note 220. Under the temporary regulations in order to receive a full basis allocation,
the assuming partner must be subjected to personal liability and the creditor must be aware
of the assumption and have a direct action against the assuming partner. See Temp. Treas.
Reg. § 1.752-IT(f), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,150 (1988).
299. See Temp. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A)(1)(ii), (B)(2), (C), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140,
53,145 (1988).
300. See id; see supra note 247.




sequently, unless the limited partner assumes all or a portion of the
liability, the unpaid capital contribution obligation serves as a ceiling
on the amount the limited partner's outside basis can increase for its
share of partnership recourse debt.3° This is true regardless of how
the partners have agreed to allocate losses for tax purposes.3 4 The
general partner or partners are ultimately liable for all partnership
recourse debt. Therefore, amounts that limited partners cannot add
to their outside bases will be added to the general partners' outside
bases in proportion to their loss sharing ratio, absent other side agree-
ments such as an assumption3so
Allocations of losses and deductions attributable to recourse debt
must have substantial economic effect.3s 6 Allocations which do not have
substantial economic effect are reallocated among the partners in ac-
cord with the partner's interest in the partnership.30 7 The economic
303. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,146 (1988).
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended in 1987). Several exceptions exist in which
allocations will be valid without meeting the substantial economic effect tests. The most important
exception is an allocation attributable to a nonrecourse deduction. See supra text accompanying
notes 267-86.
Other provisions dictate exactly how the partnership's items will be allocated for tax purposes.
These include: (1) allocations where there is a book-tax disparity due to contributed property
or otherwise, see I.R.C. § 704(c) (1986) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 236-40);
and (2) allocations where the partner's interests in the partnership have shifted during the
taxable year, see I.R.C. § 706(d) (West Supp. 1989). A detailed discussion of these provisions
is beyond the scope of this article.
To determine if an allocation has substantial economic effect, the partnership must conduct
a two-part analysis at the end of its taxable year to which the allocation related. Such allocation
must have economic effect and must be substantial. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(i) (as amended
in 1987).
A complete discussion of substantiality is beyond the scope of this article. Generally, an
allocation will be reallocated in accord with the partners' interest in the partnership on the
grounds of not being substantial if the tax consequences result in at least one partner being
enhanced (in present value terms) by the allocation as compared to what the tax consequences
would have been if the allocation were not contained in the partnership agreement and a "strong
likelihood" exists that the after-tax consequences in present value terms will be substantially
diminished for no partner as compared with the after-tax consequences had the allocation not
been included in the partnership agreement. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704(b)(2)(iii) (as amended in
1987). In other words, by looking at the partners as a group, one can determine the likely tax
effect of the allocation; if the tax savings is likely to be large and the economic impact on the
partners is likely to be small, then the allocation will not be substantial.
307. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987). The determination of the partners'
interests in the partnership involves a facts-and-circumstances test to determine the overall
economic arrangement in the partnership. The factors considered include: (1) the partners'
relative contributions to the partnership; (2) the interests of the partners in economic profits
and losses if different than their interest in taxable income or loss; (3) the interest of the partners
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effect requirement of the substantial economic effect test attempts to
ensure that if there is an economic benefit or burden, the tax allocation
of income or deductions will correspond to the economic allocations of
the benefits or burdens.3 8 The basic safe harbor for economic effect
requires: (1) that in accordance with the partnership agreement, the
partnership maintain capital accounts 3°9 under the rules set out in
section 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv) of the regulations; (2) that liquidation of the
partnership must entitle the partners to liquidating distributions ac-
cording to their positive book capital account balances;310 and (3) that
if a partner's capital account is negative, 311 the partnership must
unconditionally obligate that partner to restore this deficit by making
actual contributions to the partnership.3 12 The partner must make these
contributions on or before the date of the partnership's liquidation or
within ninety days thereafter. 3A
Partners that are allocated substantial losses are often uncomfort-
able with agreeing to an unlimited restoration obligation. When a
partner's obligation to restore a negative capital account is limited or
nonexistent, the regulations provide an alternate test to meet the
economic effect prong.314 The first two requirements for the alternative
test are identical to the first two requirements in the basic economic
effect test. The partnership agreement must maintain capital accounts
in cash flow and other nonliquidating distributions; and (4) the rights of the partners to distri-
butions of capital upon liquidation. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(3).
308. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(a). In other words, the partner who reports taxable income and
gain ultimately should receive that economic benefit, and the partner who is allocated tax losses
and deductions ultimately should bear that economic burden.
309. A partner's capital account represents a share of the partnership's economic net worth.
Capital account maintenance is based on economic rather than tax concepts; consequently, the
rules for increasing and decreasing capital accounts do not always coincide with the outside
basis rules. Capital accounts will be increased by the cash and the fair market value (net of
liabilities) of property contributed by the partners as well as allocations of partnership income.
Capital accounts will not be increased for a partner's share of partnership liabilities because
liabilities do not increase the partnership's positive net worth. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv)
(as amended in 1987). Capital accounts are decreased by distributions and losses allocated from
the partnership. Id.
310. See id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2).
311. A partner's capital account, unlike outside basis, can be reduced below zero. This
usually occurs when the partnership has substantial liabilities and losses or distributions attribut-
able to those liabilities have been allocated to the partners. Outside bases but not capital
accounts, will be increased by those liabilities. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(iv).
312. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(b)(2).
313. Id.
314. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d).
[Vol. 41
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
and follow positive account balances at liquidation.a15 Generally, if a
number of other requirements are met,3 16 the partnership can allocate
losses to a partner, allowing the partner's capital account to go nega-
tive to the extent of such partner's limited restoration obligation.317
A limited restoration obligation requires the partner to contribute a
limited amount to the partnership on or before the date of the partner-
ship's liquidation or within ninety days thereafter2 s
Partnership losses arising from recourse deductions must meet
either the basic economic effect test or the alternate test. If the losses
fail to meet either test, the partnership must reallocate the losses in
accordance with each partner's interest in the partnership.319 Con-
sequently, partners that are allocated losses that create a negative
balance in their capital account face the possibility of having to make
cash contributions to the partnership at some time in the future.3 °
315. Id.
316. For purposes of determining how negative the partner's capital account is, which in
turn dictates how large the limited restoration obligation must be to cover the allocated loss,
the partner's capital account is reduced up front for expected distributions of cash flow, with
no income allocations and expected allocations of losses and deductions under I.R.C. § 704(e)(2)
(1986) and I.R.C. § 706(d) (West Supp. 1989). The theory behind this requirement is to ensure
that partners with limited restoration obligations actually bear the losses allocated to them. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(4)-(6) (as amended in 1987). For example, if a partner had a
limited restoration obligation and was allocated losses which brought its capital account negative
by that amount, cash flow in excess of income would drive its capital account below the limited
restoration obligation, preventing the partner from bearing the loss. If the capital account is
reduced up front for those expected cash flows in excess of taxable income, losses cannot be
allocated to the partner unless the limited restoration obligation is large enough to cover the
up-front reduction as well. The partnership agreement must also have a "qualified income offset."
This requires that if the capital account of a partner is unexpectedly reduced below the limited
restoration obligation (e.g., by an unexpected distribution of cash flow without income), then
the partnership must allocate income, including gross income, to that partner so as to eliminate
any deficit as quickly as possible. See id. § 1.704 1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(3). Since the capital account cannot
be reduced up front for unexpected cash flow in excess of income, requiring income allocations
to eliminate such disparity helps ensure that the partner will bear the loss. Id.
317. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(d)(3) (as amended in 1987).
318. Id. § 1.704-1(b)(2)(ii)(c).
319. See supra note 307.
320. See supra test accompanying notes 312, 314, 317-18. One way to avoid having to
restore a negative capital account with actual cash contributions is to allocate income to the
partners with negative capital accounts as soon as the partnership has income. Such income
allocations run the risk of being reallocated on the grounds of insubstantiality, if there is not
sufficient risk that the partnership will never have income to allocate. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-
1(b)(2)(iii)(c) (as amended in 1987). Safe harbors exist which will deem allocations of income to
partners with negative capital accounts to be substantial without regard to how risky the
business is. If the later income allocation is limited to income from the sale of the property,
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When attempting to analyze the recourse debt rules in the context
of LLCs, it is useful to analogize all members to limited partners.
This is because under state law, LLC members are not personally
liable for the LLC's debts, and creditors cannot force members to
contribute more than their unpaid capital contribution obligations to
pay such debts. 21 Like limited partners, LLC members with no unpaid
capital contribution obligation cannot be forced to contribute capital
and therefore have no risk of loss directly or indirectly for the LLC's
debts unless they contractually assume or guarantee the debt.2 Con-
sequently, the LLC may not allocate increases to the member's outside
bases for Net Contribution Obligations in excess of their unpaid capital
contribution obligations.32
If a member either assumes or guarantees the LLC's obligation,
the member will have a Net Payment Obligation equal to the entire
amount assumed or guaranteed.m The member's outside basis will
also receive a corresponding increase equal to the amount of the entire
obligation32 The regulations treat the debt as recourse to the extent
of the assumption or guarantee.3 26 Consequently, LLC losses arising
from liabilities which a member has assumed or guaranteed must have
substantial economic effect. Because of this, the LLC must generally
allocate such losses to the member that assumed or guaranteed the
obligation, assuming the allocation is substantial.
32 7
If a member or a person related to a member 328 makes a loan32 to
the LLC, the regulations treat that member as bearing the entire
risk of loss with respect to that loan. Accordingly, that member's
outside basis is increased for the entire loan. 0 To the extent the
which produced the losses (e.g., through depreciation), then the allocations will always be
substantial. Moreover, if the income allocations restoring the negative capital accounts are
delayed for at least five years then all later allocations of income, even operating income, will
be deemed to be substantial. Id.
321. Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-113, -121(a); FLA. STAT. ANN § 608.435, .436.
322. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
323. See supra text accompanying notes 301-02.
324. See supra notes 247, 287.
325. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(ii)(A), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,145 (1988). An
assumption or guarantee will produce the same result. See supra note 287.
326. See supra notes 247, 287.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 306-18.
328. See supra note 290 (defining a "related person").
329. All loans made to the LLC by members will be nonrecourse. See supra note 265 and
accompanying text.
330. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1T(d)(3)(i)(B), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,145 (1988). But
see Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.752 1T(d)(3)(vii), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,140, 53,150 (1988) (providing a de
minimis rule which allows partners owning 10% or less of the partnership to make nonrecourse
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property, which the LLC acquired from the debt proceeds, generates
losses reducing the property's basis below the principal of the debt,
such losses are nonrecourse deductions.-91 But, because the non-
recourse deductions are from "partner nonrecourse debt," the LLC
must allocate all of the losses to the member that made the loan to
the LLC.3 12 If in a later year the LLC pays off all or part of the loan,
or the creditor otherwise discharges the loan through foreclosure, the
LLC must allocate income to the lending member to the extent such
member's economic risk is eliminated.m
VI. CONCLUSION
Because the Service has recognized the LLC's status as a partner-
ship, prospective partners and joint venturers should have far less
hesitation when considering the LLC as a possible vehicle for conduct-
ing business. The LLC seems to be the first entity that has all the
advantages of a partnership for tax purposes while, at the same time,
provides all members with the same limited liability enjoyed by corpo-
rate shareholders. When considering use of an LLC, one should care-
fully examine the characteristics of the proposed business and the
advantages that the LLC offers over more traditional forms available
for operating that business. The LLC is not a panacea that offers
substantial advantages for all types of businesses. With certain ven-
tures that are traditionally conducted in large limited partnerships
with limited partners that are essentially passive investors, the LLC
offers no significant advantages and jeopardizes the certainty of
partnership status. In other situations, however, particularly those
with a limited number of participants and a high degree of leverage
and risk, the LLC's absolute limited liability feature under state law
combined with its status as a partnership for tax purposes may offer
material advantages over a smaller limited partnership or S corpora-
tion. Only time will tell whether the advantages ultimately will out-
weigh some of the current corporate uncertainties of the LLC form.
These uncertainties have arisen because of the LLC's limited use up
to this time and the lack of legal precedents to guide planners. As
time passes and more LLCs are formed, these uncertainties should
dissipate. Additionally, if more states adopt limited liability company
acts, the LLC's popularity will likely flourish.
loans to the partnership and not be treated as bearing the entire risk of loss if such loan is
qualified nonrecourse financing within the meaning of I.R.C. § 465).
331. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1T(b)(4)(iv)(h), 53 Fed. Reg. 53,161, 53,163 (1988).
332. Id.
333. Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(b)(5) ex. 15 (as amended in 1987).

